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I. INTRODUCTION
The scenario is not difficult to foresee: as a prospective employee
signs her employment agreement with a new employer she notices a
clause mentioning arbitration. Arbitration?' Some may have a vague
idea of what arbitration is--an alternative dispute resolution (ADR)'
method used to resolve disputes in lieu of going to trial. Others have no
idea what it is. Either way, most prospective employees do not care.
First and foremost, employees want a job and leave the concept of arbi-
tration to be dealt with if and when it arises.' Whether individuals
know a little about arbitration, know nothing about arbitration, or are
fairly well-versed in the concept of arbitration, most probably do not
know that signing an employment contract with an arbitration clause is
not merely an agreement to forego litigation of job related disputes.'
Rather, under such a clause, a person forfeits valuable rights, such as
the ability to appeal the final decision in all but the most oppressive cir-
cumstances.6
This Comment discusses this concern, and others, regarding arbitra-
tion in the employment context. Part II focuses on the growing trend
toward utilizing arbitration to settle employment related disputes." Part
III examines some of the concerns resulting from this expanding use of
ADR and the resulting need for caution by employees, employers, and
the legal system as a whole.7 Part IV analyzes methods used to deter-
1. Arbitration is defined as: "[a] process of dispute resolution in which a neutral
third party (arbitrator) renders a decision after a hearing at which both parties have
an opportunity to be heard," and "[aln arrangement for taking and abiding by the
judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to estab-
lished tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the
expense and vexation of ordinary litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed.
1990) (the latter quoting Wauregan Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of Am.,
A.F.LC.I.O., 146 A.2d 592, 595 (Conn. 1958)).
Those favoring arbitration classify the process as "a fast, effective means for re-
solving disputes without the delays and exorbitant costs of litigation." Michael Z.
Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Future Disputes: Mere
Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Consumer?, 5 Loy. CONSUMER L REP.
112 (1993), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL database, at WL 1, &
Although arbitration can be non-binding, the term "arbitration" in this Comment
will refer to binding arbitration
2. Alternative dispute resolution refers to processes other than traditional court
adjudication used to settle claims. "[Tihe overarching goal of alternative dispute res-
olution is to provide equal justice to all." Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L REV. 668, 684 (1986).
3. See infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
4. See iftfa notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 238-58 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 14-98 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 99-188 and accompanying text.
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mine whether the arbitration clauses are valid, given the inequality of
bargaining power often present in the employment context.8 To prevent
dissatisfaction with the arbitration process after the fact, Part V propos-
es more effective procedures for ensuring that arbitration agreements
are truly bargained for at the implementation stage.' In addition, since
most courts are willing to uphold arbitration clauses even when an
inequality of bargaining power is present between employees and em-
ployers," Part VI proposes methods to reduce the bias and harsh ef-
fects of binding arbitration as currently practiced." Recognizing that
arbitration is fast becoming a necessary procedure for resolving em-
ployment related disputes,' Part VII concludes by acknowledging that
this process is beneficial for all participants when properly implement-
ed and regulated.'3
I1. TREND TOWARD SELECTING ARBITRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT DIsPurTEs
A. Increased Use of ADR in General
The employment sector is one of many groups joining the national
trend toward using alternative dispute resolution processes to resolve
disputes." Following the re-enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)" in 1947, the federal government advocated a public policy fa-
voring arbitration.'" The FAA applies to contracts that are both signed
8. See infra notes 189-272 and accompanying text.
9. See inftu notes 273-319 and accompanying text
10. See infra notes 195-214 and accompanying text
11. See infra notes 320-401 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 31-98 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 402-14 and accompanying text
14. S. Gale Dick, ADR at the Crossroads, 49 DIsP. RESOL. J., Mar. 1994, at 47, 52.
Examples of other industries heavily utilizing ADR are securities, construction, health
care, and banldng. James R. Butler Jr., Arbitration As a Means of Enhancing Con-
sumer Relations, 110 BANING LJ. 527, 528 (1993).
15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988). The FAA codified the general and permanent laws
relating to arbitration. See id.
16. Jeffrey R. Knight, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 251, 252 (1994) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); see also John A. Gray, Have
the Foxes Become the Guardians of the Chickens? The Post-Gilmer Legal Status qf
Predispute Mandatory Arbitration as a Condition of Employment, 37 VII. L REV.
113, 121 (1992) (recognizing the federal policy favoring arbitration); Garry G.
Mathiason & Pavneet Singh Uppal, Evaluating and Using Employer-Initiated Arbi-
tration Polucies and Agreements: Preparing the Workplace for the Twenty-First Cen-
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by employees who do not fall within the contracts of employment ex-
clusion" and relate to transactions in interstate or international com-
merce.'
8
Like the federal government, the states have enacted similar policies
favoring arbitration by either adopting the Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA)9 or drafting their own arbitration provisions.' While the state
statutes generally have provisions suggesting guidelines for conducting
arbitration proceedings, the federal statute does not.2' As the federal
arbitration statute preempts state law,' arbitration proceedings man-
tury, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS (American Law Inst-American Bar Ass'n 1994), 16.22 available in WESTLAW,
All-ABA database, C902 AI-ABA 875, 887 (recognizing the federal policy favoring
arbitration). The FAA states in pertinent part:
A written provision in any ... contract ... to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising out of such contract... or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbi-
tration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract .... or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
17. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). For a discussion of the contracts of employment exclu-
sion, see ifra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
18. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Most agreements containing arbitration clauses will be
subject to the FAA as commerce is broadly construed. Green, supra note 1, at WL 9.
19. The states that have adopted the UAA are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colora-
do, Delaware, District of Colombia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylva-
nia, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and
Wyoming. Uniform Arb. Act, 7 U.LA. I (Supp. 1993).
The UAA states in pertinent part- "A written agreement to submit to arbitration
any controversy existing or arising after the effective date of the agreement is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract" Uniform Arbitration Act § 1, 7 U.LA. 5 (1985).
20. R. Bales, A New Direction For American Labor Law: Individual Autonomy
and the Comnpulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 Hous. L REV.
1863, 1910 (1994); see, e.g., CAL Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1288 (West 1982 & Supp.
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408-424 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to -83 (Michle 1982 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R. 7501-7514
(McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1995).
21. Matidason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 887.
22. Id. at 886; see also Marshall W. Grate, Binding Arbitration of Statutory Em-
ployment Discrimination Claims, 70 U. DET. MERCY L REv. 699, 701 (1993) (recog-
nizing preemptive authority of Supreme Court); Green, supra note 1, at WL 8; see,
e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490, 491 (1987) (stating that federal statutes pre-
empt state statutes under the Supremacy Clause); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (state franchise law providing for court adjudication preempted
by FAA); Preston v. Knuezer, 641 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (N.D. M. 1986) (all state claims
must be arbitrated even if separate proceedings must be held in separate forums).
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dated by the FAA will not be subject to any procedural guidelines.
Therefore, when the FAA controls, one of the state's standardized pro-
cedures or the rules of an institutional provider of dispute resolution
services should be consulted to provide structure while safeguarding
the arbitration proceeding from abuse.'
Other events that have triggered the growing use of ADR to resolve
disputes are the 1991 Executive Order on Civil Justice Reform' and
the ADR Act of 19 9 0 .' Largely as a result of this government recogni-
tion of ADR, forty-six states and approximately 1200 courts currently
have ADR programs in place.' The growing trend of using ADR in lieu
of the courts cannot be disputed.'
B. Appeal of ADR to the Employment Sector
The concept of ADR appeals to the employment sector for three main
reasons. First, the increasing number of employment related disputes is
burdening the court system.' Second, statutory rights relating to em-
ployment encourage the use of ADR.' Third, many advantages result
from resolving disputes through arbitration rather than traditional litiga-
tion.'
23. See Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 886. Institutional providers of dis-
pute resolution services have their own procedural rules for conducting the arbitra-
tion process and panels of arbitrators from which disputants may select an arbitrator.
These rules, however, are not set in stone. If the disputants do not wish to follow
them, they can amend the rules so that they are mutually agreeable or adopt another
institution's rules while still using the original service's arbitrators. Examples of insti-
tutional providers of dispute resolution services are the American Arbitration Associa-
tion (AAA), Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), Endispute, and the
Center for Public Resources (CPR). Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal and Practical Implica-
tions of ADR and Arbitration in Employment Disputes, 11 HoFSTRA LAB. LJ. 247,
265 (1993)
24. Exec. Order No. 12, 778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55195 (1991). The 1991 executive order
encourages federal agencies to use voluntary dispute resolution procedures in settling
their cases. See id.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 571-583 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The ADR Act encourages the use
of ADR in administrative proceedings. See id.
26. Dick, supra note 14, at 50.
27. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 58-98 and accompanying text.
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1. Employment Related Disputes are Increasing in Number
The national trend toward the use of ADR, and arbitration in particu-
lar, is viewed as a positive development by the employment sector pri-
marily because the number of employment related cases is growing so
rapidly that the courts cannot accommodate them." Employment dis-
putes are on the rise due to three main forces: the erosion of the con-
cept of at-will employment,' the creation of new statutory rights for
employees,' and decreased participation in labor unions."
a. Erosion of the concept of at-wiU employment
The transformation of the traditional at-will employment scheme into
one with a preference for a more stable job atmosphere has resulted in
an increased number of employment related claims.' This trend to-
ward promulgating employee stability is the result of three major forc-
es.' First, courts are restricting an employer's right to terminate em-
ployees when the employee refuses to act against public policy.w Sec-
31. Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 247. "Employment litigation has grown at a rate
many times greater than litigation in general." Id. Furthermore, there are over 25,000
wrongful discharge cases requiring juries waiting to be heard in the state and federal
courts. Id. at 249; see also Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?,
61 UMKC L REv. 693, 695 (1993) (as a result of approximately three million termina-
tions each year, employees challenging such decisions will impose a huge burden on
the courts); James A. King, Jr. et al., Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 LAB.
LAW. 97 (1993) (stating that there has been a 216696 increase in employment discrimi-
nation cases since the 1970s); Stephen W. Skrainka, The Utility of Arbitration Agree-
ments in Employment Manuals and Collective Bargaining Agreements for Resolving
Civil Rights, Age and ADA Claims, 37 ST. Louis U. UJ. 985, 992 (1993) (stating that
the number of age discrimination cases tripled between 1980 and 1985, adding to
already crowded court dockets); Even J. Spelfogel, New Trends in the Arbitration of
Employment Disputes, 48 Aim. J., Mar. 1993, at 6 (stating that "[ain increasing num-
ber of employment-related ... cases ... are causing lengthy delays for employees in
obtaining their 'day in court'") [hereinafter New Trends].
32. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
33. See itfra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
34. See inf a notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
35. See infa notes 36-41 and accompanying text
36. See infta notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
37. Berger, supra note 31, at 694; see also Warren Martin, Employment at Wi/
Just Cause Protection Through Mandatory Arbitration, 62 WASH. L REV. 151, 154
(1987); see, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn.
1980) (quality control director for food company had a valid cause of action against
employer who allegedly fired him in retaliation for the employee's insistence that the
employer comply with the requirements of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act); Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 471 (Ct. App. Md 1981) (recognizing that
employees will have a cause of action when terminated for a reason violating public
policy but finding that a prima facie case must first be met showing that the conduct
1492
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ond, courts are increasingly finding implied contracts of employment
resulting from verbal guarantees of job security and the presence of
employee handbooks detailing policies and benefits.' Third, the courts
are, with growing frequency, recognizing an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, thereby limiting employee discharges for equity
reasons.' As a result of these employee biased changes in employment
law, employees have an increased incentive to bring suit for money
damages and redress.' The desire to curb this tide of lawsuits has led
employers to include arbitration clauses in their employment con-
tracts.
41
b. Creation of new statutory rights for employees
Recent congressional action vests employees with new statutory
rights and provides for jury trials and punitive damages to redress viola-
tions.' Some of the statutory rights that relate to employment origi-
would violate public policy); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871-78
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (employee could raise a cause of action against her employer
who allegedly terminated her after she refused to disregard FDA policies and threat-
ened to report her employer to the FDA); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysvllle, 331
S.E.2d 797, 802 (Va. 1985) (employees had cause of action against employer who
allegedly terminated the employees in retaliation for the employees' exercise of their
rights as shareholders).
38. Berger, supra note 31, at 694; see also Martin, supra note 37, at 155; see, e.g.,
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (finding that
either an oral promise or a personnel policy handbook are sufficient to be construed
as an implied contract). But see Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Co., 745 S.W.2d 661,
662 (Mo. 1988) (finding no implied contract from the existence of a unilaterally im-
posed employee handbook).
39. Berger, supra note 31, at 694; see also Martin, supra note 37, at 157; see, e.g.,
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (CL App. 1981) (terminating
long-term employee without good cause established a cause of action for wrongful
termination based on implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). But see
Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (duty to
act in good faith and fair dealing does not create an independent cause of action
against an employer).
40. Berger, supra note 31, at 695.
41. Mathiason & Uppal, suprm note 16, at 880; see also Dick, supra note 14, at 52.
42. Berger, supra note 31, at 693; see also W. Terrence Kllroy & Adam P. Sachs,
Arbitrating Employment Disputes; Greener Pastures for Employers?, 62 APR J. KAN.
BA. 32 (1993) (noting that employment litigation is increasing due to the "passage of
numerous federal and state statutes creating individual causes of action for employ-
ment disputes"). Formerly, damages were limited to equitable relief and could be
tried by a judge. Id.
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nate in the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(WARN),' the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA)" and the
Family and Medical Leave Act.'
Additionally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991' amends five statutes di-
rectly relating to employment matters: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,"T the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),' the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA)," the Civil Rights Act of
1866,' and the Civil Rights Attorney's Awards Act." Common sense
dictates that the more protection an employee has, the more likely
employer actions will be challenged.
c. Decreased union membership
A final reason for the increase in employment disputes is the decline
of unionization.' Disputants who, in the past, may have settled their
claims through collective bargaining must now proceed individually.'
2. Statutory Provisions Encourage the Use of ADR
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 not only grants aggrieved parties the
right to a jury trial, it also encourages the use of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms." It is unclear whether the language of the Act
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988) (requiring notice to qualified employees before
plant closings and major layoffs).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988) (prohibiting the use of lie detector tests and
polygraphs in the workplace).
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (providing employees receive up to
12 weeks yearly of unpaid leave for the birth or adoption of a child or to take care
of a serious medical condition of the employee himself or his immediate family mem-
bers).
46. Public L No. 102-166, 105 Stat 1071-1101 (codified as amended in various
sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1992)).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. 11 1991) (prohibiting discrimination in the
workplace based on race, color, national origin, sex or religion).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991) (prohibiting discrimination in
the workplace based on disability).
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (prohibiting discrimination in the
workplace based on age).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (giving all persons the right to sue and to full benefit
of the laws).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing the judge with discretion
to award attorney's fees to a party raising a statutory claim).
52. Jay W. Waks & Linda M. Gadsby, Arbitration and ADR in the Employment
Area, in ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER ADR METHODS (American Law
Inst-American Bar Ass'n 1993), available in WESTLAW, All-ABA database, C879
ALI-ABA 439, 488.
53. See id.
54. Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Ehforcement, 23
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reflects legislative intent that parties to an employment contract may
provide that future disputes be arbitrated.' However, the Act went
into effect after the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corporation,' and therefore, "it certainly seems
plausible that Gilmer changed Congressional understanding of the legal
limits on arbitration... and that consequently, the legislative histo-
ry... is of limited significance. "57
3. Advantages of Arbitration Over Court Adjudication
The advantages of arbitration have led employers to write arbitration
clauses into their non-union employment contracts." Employers in par-
ticular want to adopt arbitration and avoid litigation for several rea-
sons.' In addition, there are other reasons for adopting arbitration pro-
cedures that benefit both parties.'
STETSON L REV. 53, 54 (1993). Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act recognizes ADR
procedures as a viable means for resolving disputes including such processes as "set-
tlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factflnding, minitrials, and
arbitration." 42 U.S.C. 1981 (Supp. V 1993); see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1081. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071-1101 (providing the modifications of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
areas affected by § 118).
55. Livingston, supra note 64, at 90-93.
56. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
57. See Livingston, supra note 54, at 93. For a complete discussion of Gilmer, see
infa notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
58. Mathlason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 880; see also Dick, supra note 14, at 52.
Arbitration in labor law is not new, having been used in the past for collective bar-
gaining agreements. Francis X. Dee, Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in
Resolving Employer-Employee Disputes, in DIsPurE RESOLUIION ALTERNATIVES
SUPERCOURSE at 377, (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 481,
1993); see also Loren K Allison & Eric H. J. Stahlhut, Arbitration and the ADA: Do
the Two Make Strange Bedfellows?, 37 REs GwrE 168, 168 (1993). However, with
the recent trend toward non-unionization, arbitration clauses have now started appear-
ing in non-union workplace agreements as well. Martin L Malin & Robert F.
Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employ-
ment Arbitration Prom the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HAmNGs LJ. 1187,
1188 (1993). Further, "[tihe decline of collective bargaining .. . has fostered debate
over whether... arbitration can be imported from the unionized to the non union-
ized workplace." Id. at 1188.
59. See infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
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a. Employer advantages resulting from the arbitration of
workplace disputes
First and foremost, employers desire to avoid excessive damage
awards."' The general perception is that juries tend to give large dam-
age awards,' whereas judges and arbitrators typically exercise more
restraint.' In addition, arbitrators are less likely than juries to impose
punitive damages."
Secondly, because judges and arbitrators generally defer to employer
interests, employers are more likely to win if they arbitrate the dis-
pute.' In contrast, "U]uries are perceived to be notoriously biased
against employers."' Consequently, employers risk losing a case, even
61. Kilroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 33.
62. Id. At the high end, wrongful discharge cases have garnered $32 million, $43
million and $124 million verdicts in some states. Id. Other common jury awards fall
in the $200,000-$800,000 range. Id. One study of wrongful discharge claims found that
the average jury verdict was approximately $650,000 with another one-third of those
cases also receiving punitive damages averaging $523,170. King, et aL, supra note 31,
at 99-100. In California, when a plaintiff is successful in a wrongful termination suit,
the average recovery is $450,000. Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation:
"Dagwood" & Goliath, 62 MICH. BAR J. 776, 776 (1983); see Martin, supra note 37, at
168. However, this data is slightly misleading since only "high damage cases are
likely to go to trial" and plaintiffs are likely to settle before trial if an employer has
a strong defense. Palefsky, supra, at 776; see Martin, supra note 37, at 168 n.113; see
also Dee, supra note 58, at 389-90 (stating that sympathetic juries wishing to impose
large damage awards are not as prevalent as commonly believed).
63. John M. Husband & Brian M. Mumaugh, Arbitration of Employment Disputes
After Gilmer, 20 CoO. LAw. 2277, 2279 (1991); of Kilroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at
33 ("[A]rbitrators [may be] less likely than juries to grant especially high damage
awards.-).
64. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 171. But see Dee, supra note 58, at 389-
90 (stating that juries do not award punitive damages that often but, due to publicity
of large verdicts, merely seem as if they do); Skrainka, supra note 31, at 990-91 (not-
Ing that while one particular arbitrator awarded punitive damage only once in 50
cases, other arbitrators award punitive damages more often in "appropriate cases").
This belief may in part be due to the fact that some courts hold that arbitrators do
not have the authority to award punitive damages. Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 267.
65. Paul W. Cane, Jr. & Nancy L Abell, Binding Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Workplace 2-2 (May 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the law office of
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker). But cf. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172
(stating that many arbitrators actually have a pro-employee bias that may be detri-
mental to the employer, however, the employer may be prevent this through careful
arbitrator selection).
66. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172 (emphasis added). Indeed, a 1982
survey by a San Francisco law firm found that employees win 9096 of wrongful termi-
nation cases where there is a jury trial. Palefsky, supra note 62, at 776; see Martin,
supra note 37, at 168.
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with a solid defense by choosing to litigate.7 Many employers prefer to
bypass this uncertainty through adopting arbitration.'
Furthermore, employers often view arbitrators as better overall
decision-makers.' The arbitrators used in labor disputes generally have
experience in the employment field and consequently are "better able to
understand the dynamics of the workplace" and recognize when an
employee has or has not been the subject of discrimination.m Addition-
ally, arbitrators are less likely to succumb to "community pressures and
attitudes" than juries."
Lastly, employers often prefer arbitration because of the effects pub-
lic trials may have on their companies.' Avoiding negative publicity is
the primary concern, since no company wants to be labeled as being
unfair to its employees.' Arbitration avoids such publicity as most ar-
bitrations are held in private and the awards remain confidential.'
Many employers also institute arbitration procedures as a means of
communicating to their employees that they are open to resolving a
dispute without litigation.
b. The mutual advantages of arbitration to employers and
employees
Arbitration benefits both employers and employees.' The speed with
which arbitration can resolve disputes is one of the primary benefits."
67. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172.
68. See id
69. Id.
70. Id
71. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 879.
72. See Allison & Stahihut, supra note 58, at 171-72; Knight, supra note 16, at 251.
73. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 171-72; see also Knight, supra note 16, at
251.
74. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 879; see also Edward Brunet, Arbitration
and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L REV. 81, 84-85 (1992); Grate, supra note 22, at
701 (noting that "arbitration is usually less costly than litigation").
75. See Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 15, at 895.
76. See infra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
77. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 894. For example, litigated cases general-
ly take three to eight years to reach final resolution while arbitration can generally
resolve disputes in less than 10 months. Id.; see also Allison & Stahlhut, supra note
58, at 171 (finding that the average employment dispute was resolved through arbitra-
tion in 268 days, whereas a court adjudication would haven taken a significantly lon-
ger time); Grate, supra note 22, at 701 (noting that arbitration is "usually faster" than
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Studies have shown that while employment claims can take years to get
to trial,' arbitration can resolve claims "within a matter of months.""
Another mutual benefit of arbitration is that it is less expensive than
trial.' Because employment disputes are generally fact specific, "'for-
malized discovery'" is not needed.8' This directly 'reduces the costs to
the parties in resolving their dispute.' In addition, because there is no
trial time involved, attorneys' fees generally are less.' The reduced
cost of arbitration is valuable to employees because the expense of
litigation may sometimes induce victims to relinquish meritorious
claims.' It is also beneficial to employers as the average cost of de-
fending a claim in court has been estimated at a staggering $90,000.'
A third benefit commonly associated with arbitration is finality.'
Since both employer and employee agree' to resolve a dispute through
litigation); Knight, supra note 16, at 251. But see Dee, supra note 58, at 389 (noting
that fewer evidentiary restraints and the inapplicability of summary judgment may
cause arbitration to outlast a trial); Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172 (lengthy
trial process may be a benefit to employer to "wear down" an employee).
78. King et al., supra note 31, at 99.
79. Carol-Teigue J. Thomas, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: When is
an Employee's Right to a Judicial Forum Precluded by an Arbitration Agreement?,
27 NEW ENG. L REv. 791, 795 (1993) (citation omitted); Perspective: ADR Techniques
Gaining Favor in Non-Traditional Settings, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) Mar. 15, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, BNA-LB DATABASE, 48 DLR c-i, 1993 (noting the average
arbitration resolves claims within "one or two days"); see also David G. Savage, Jus-
tice Rules Arbitration Preempts Suits in Bias Cases, LA. TIMES, May 14, 1991, at
A20.
80. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 894. "It is undeniable that arbitration is
a less costly method of resolving problems in the workplace than traditional litiga-
tion." Id. Arbitration of employment disputes may reduce costs by as much as 5096.
ld.; see also Grate, supra note 22, at 701 (listing reduced costs as one of the advan-
tages of arbitration); Knight, supra note 16, at 251. But see Dee, supra note 58, at
388-89 (noting that arbitration is not always cheaper than litigation); Waks & Gadsby,
supra note 52, at 514 (expressing employer concerns that arbitration is "very costly"
because it encourages employee claims).
81. King et al., supra note 31, at 101.
82. 1d; see also Thomas, supra note 79, at 795. However, while arbitration may
limit discovery costs, this aspect of arbitration has its disadvantages. For example, an
employee is "typically not given the right to engage in extensive discovery or compel
production of documents." Thomas, supra note 79, at 795 (emphasis added).
83. Thomas, supra note 79, at 795.
84. King et al., supra note 31, at 99 (citation omitted).
85. King et al., supra note 31, at 100 (citation omitted).
86. Berger, supra note 31, at 701-02. However, finality is not a benefit to a party
if the arbitration was not properly agreed to. For a discussion of the various meth-
ods of obtaining agreement, see infra notes 280-319 and accompanying text. It also is
not a benefit if the process does not adequately protect a party's rights. For a dis-
cussion of how to safeguard rights during arbitration, see infra notes 320-401 and
accompanying text.
87. For a discussion as to whether the parties are indeed agreeing to the arbitra-
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arbitration, the controversy is taken out of the court system and its
lengthy appeals process.' The "emerging standard" of arbitration provi-
sions in employment contracts leads to their general enforcement'
Further, since an award can be vacated only under narrow circumstanc-
es dictated by statute,- finality of the arbitrator's decision is virtually certain"
tion, see infra notes 280-319 and accompanying text
88. See King, supra note 31, at 102-03; see Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at
879-80.
89. Dick, supra note 14, at 52-53; see also infra notes 105-42 and accompanying
text.
90. According to the FAA, an arbitral award will be vacated as follows:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter was not
made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discre-
tion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The standards for vacating an arbitral award according to the Uniform Arbitration
Act are substantially similar to the FAA provisions. See Uniform Arb. Act § 12, 7 ULA
140 (1985).
The standards for vacating an arbitral award under the California Arbitration Act
are as follows:
The court shall vacate the award if the court determines any of the follow-
ing:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
(c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator,
(d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected
without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted;
or
(e) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of
the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown
therefore or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the
controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions
of this title.
CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
91. See Brunet, supra note 74, at 86-87 (noting that the "chances of overturning an
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Other benefits of arbitration are intangible.' Trial proceedings may
have adverse psychological and social effects on some participants.'
Generally, this result can be avoided through arbitration.' Further,
ADR methods, such as arbitration, allow the parties to maintain more
control over the process and proceed with less antagonism toward the
opposing side.' Since an employee may retain her job after the dispute
is resolved, it is often vital that the parties maintain a working rela-
tionship.' With ADR, there is a greater likelihood that the parties will
have an amicable agreement thus preserving such a relationship.' Last-
ly, arbitration allows for a broad range of remedies not always available
in a court adjudication.'
m. THE NEED FOR CAUTION
From the above analysis, it is apparent that many employment dis-
putes will be arbitrated in the future,' and that there are potential
benefits for both parties.m However, there is need for caution by em-
ployees,' ' employers,' and the legal profession in general"~
concerning the current practice of binding arbitration. Parties must
address these concerns before agreeing to arbitration."°
arbitral award are slim").
92. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
93. King et al., supra note 31, at 99 (citation omitted).
94. See id. at 100. But see Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172 (stating that
"the emotional strain of combating an employer... [is] at play regardless if the
judiciary or an arbitrator is to resolve the dispute").
95. King et al., supra note 31, at 100-01.
96. See New Trends, supra note 31, at 11.
97. See id
98. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 171; see also Skrainka, supra note 31, at
991 (noting that more "imaginative remedies will be crafted in the course of arbitra-
tion than in the context of a court decision."); Berger, supra note 31, at 720 ("[ajrbi-
tration entails no inherent limitations on what remedies the arbitrator may order");
Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 475-76 (observing that an "adjudicator may grant
such relief as may be just and reasonable").
99. Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 488; see supra notes 14-57 and accompany-
ing text
100. See supra notes 58-98 and accompanying text
101. See itnf-a notes 105-62 and accompanying text.
102. See intfru notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
103. See infa notes 175-88 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 105-88 and accompanying text
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A. Employee Concerns
1. Arbitration Awards Cannot be Appealed Even When Based on
Erroneous Fact or Law
The California Supreme Court held, in Moncharsh v. Heily & Bla-
se," that an award resulting from a binding arbitration is not appeal-
able, even when the decision is based on erroneous fact or law."u One
rationale behind this decision was that the parties knew what they were
agreeing to when they signed the arbitration agreement and consequent-
ly traded their right to appeal for a more time efficient and less expen-
sive resolution of the dispute.'" The problem with this approach is
that employees do not always know the consequences of signing the
105. 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
106. Id. at 916. In Moncharsh, Philip Moncharsh signed an arbitration agreement
upon employment at the law firm of Hely & Blase. Id. at 901 & n.1. Mr. Moncharsh
also signed a provision stating that the law firm would receive 80, and he would
receive 2096 of any fees gained from Heily & Blase clients, should Moncharsh contin-
ue to represent them after leaving Heily & Blase. Id. Upon leaving Heily & Blase,
Moncharsh continued to represent six clients-five of whom Moncharsh brought to
the firm upon his employment and one whom Moncharsh started working with after
he began employment at Heily & Blase. Id. When attempts to settle the payment of
fees failed, the parties utilized the arbitration agreement in the employment contract
to settle the matter by arbitration. Id. One of Moncharsh's contentions at the arbitra-
tion hearing was that he had an oral agreement with Hely & Blase that the clients
he brought to the firm were to be treated different from clients gained after arriving
at the firm. Id, The arbitrator found in Heily & Blase's favor based on two points.
Id The first was the finding that any oral agreement the parties may have had was
not documented, and consequently the written agreement controlled. Id The second
was that the 80/20 split as to all the clients Moncharsh brought with him was not
unconscionable due to the fact that he was an intelligent man and did not have to
sign the provision if he felt it was unfair. Id, at 901-02. Moncharsh petitioned the
court to vacate the award and Heily & Blase petitioned for the award to be affirmed.
Id. at 902. The court affirmed the award, ruling that "[tihe arbitrator's findings on
questions of both law and fact are conclusive. A court cannot set aside an
arbitrator's error of law no matter how egregious." Id.
See also Dick, supra note 14, at 53 (discussing the court's holding in Moncharsh
and finding that the decision "bars judicial review of awards except under explicit
statutory grounds, even where an award may result in 'substantial iNustice'");
Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 896 (noting that when a jury makes a mistake,
the appellate process can correct the error, but when an arbitrator makes a mistake,
review of the decision is limited to very narrow statutory grounds for vacating the
award).
107. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 904.
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arbitration agreement." Another rationale for the decision reached by
the Moncharsh court was that the legislature already provided a remedy
for the most egregious abuses of the arbitration award and process
(vacation of an award) and, as such, the parties should already be suffi-
ciently protected." However, with the creation of so many new statu-
tory rights, greater protection from erroneous findings of fact and law
is needed because the limited grounds for vacation of an award are not
sufficient." °
The holding of Moncharsh is in line with dicta first stated by the
United States Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan."' In Wilko, the majori-
ty noted that there would be no review of an arbitration award unless
there was a "manifest disregard of the law.""' Although the court did
not define this standard, lower courts have found it to apply to situa-
tions in which the arbitrator knows the law but specifically disregards
it in reaching his decision."' As the arbitrator in Moncharsh did not
purposefully disregard the law, but rather resolved the dispute accord-
ing to principles of fairness, his actions did not amount to manifest dis-
regard for the law."" As the standard for vacating awards is high, it is
rare that courts find a "manifest disregard for the law," thus limiting the
circumstances under which an award will be vacated."'
108. See injra notes 233-68 and accompanying text.
109. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 905; see CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1995).
110. For a discussion of expanding statutory rights, see supra notes 42-51 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion that statutory rights involve more complex issues
than regular contractual disputes, see Malin & Ladenson, supra note 58, at 1189
(stating that since statutory rights are generally created for public policy reasons,
public accountability is important). For a discussion of the grounds for vacating the
arbitrators award, see supra note 90. One such ground exists where an arbitrator
exceeds his powers. CAL CIv. PRoc. CODE § 1286.2(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995). In
California, for example, erroneous reasoning is not considered excessive use of pow-
er. O Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Co., 308 P.2d 9, 11 (Cal. 1957).
111. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overrukd by Rodriguez De QuUas v. Shearson/American
Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
112. Id. at 436-37.
113. See, e.g., Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th
Cir. 1992); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683 (11th Cr. 1992), cert, denied, 113 S. CL
201 (1992); Advest Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2nd Cir. 1986).
114. See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 916 (Cal. 1992).
115. Due to the lack of written arbitral decisions, it is difficult to know exactly
why the arbitrator decided as he did. As a result, courts set a high standard for re-
view. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
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2. Arbitration of Statutory Claims Normally Accorded a Jury Trial
Will be Compelled Even if They Are Not Specifically Included in
the Scope of the Arbitration Contract
A second reason for caution on the part of employees results from
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corporation."' Specifically, Gilmer held that the
right to a judicial forum for resolution of a federal age discrimination
claim may be waived by an employee."7 The Court reasoned that a
party who agrees to arbitration is not giving up any substantive rights
to have a claim resolved, as provided by the ADEA, but is merely sub-
mitting the resolution of the dispute to a different forum."' The Court
further reasoned that because the ADEA did not preclude arbitration of
claims, this method of dispute resolution must have been contemplat-
ed."' In addition, the Court found adequate protection for an employ-
ee who claims an agreement is unenforceable due to the fact that agree-
ments to arbitrate are not automatically upheld-the contract may still
be voided according to basic contract principles."
a. Compelling arbitration when it is included in a contract of
employment
The main issue of concern for employers and employees contemplat-
ing contracting for arbitration, left unresolved by Gilmer, is whether
the FAA applies to contracts of employment.' If the FAA is found to
116. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
117. Id. at 26-27.
118. Id. at 26.
119. Id. at 27-28.
120. Id. at 33; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 627 (1985). The FAA allows for the possibility that arbitration clause will
not be upheld, but only if some "sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power"
was involved. Id. As such, the Gilmer Court reasoned that if Gilmer could prove the
contract was not valid based on more than a mere inequality of bargaining power,
then he would not be held to the arbitration. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. Absent such a
finding, the arbitration was to be compelled See id.
121. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2; see also Husband & Mumaugh, supra note 63, at
2279;, Knight, supra note 16, at 253. This is an issue because Glimer's contract was
not signed with his employer but with the NYSE as required by his employer.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added). The FAA states in pertinent part: "rN]othing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employ-
ees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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apply to employment contracts (as it was found to apply to registration
contracts), then the Gilmer decision, and cases following its reasoning,
will be binding precedent in the situation where an employee signs an
employment contract containing an arbitration clause."2 If the FAA is
found not to apply to employment contracts, then Gilmer will not be
binding precedent on employment related statutory disputes and em-
ployees will retain the right to litigate these claims."2 Since Gilmer
did not resolve this "contracts of employment" issue,"2 potential statu-
tory claim litigants can only examine to how courts have applied
Gilmer to employment contracts containing arbitration clauses thus far
to gain insight into the applicability of the FAA to these contracts."n
Most courts have found that only contracts of employment relating
specifically to those workers mentioned in the statute, and those work-
ers in similar positions who actually transport goods interstate or inter-
nationally are excluded from the arbitration provisions of the FAA.'
122. Gray, supra note 16, at 119-20. Gitmer's reasoning is "Just as applicable to an
individual employment agreement as it was to a registration agreement" Id. With
whom the employee signed, the contract was not a major issue in Gilmer. The fact
that the employee signed voluntarily was controlling. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33.
As such, it is unlikely that the Court would invalidate an arbitration contract signed
with an employer when it would not invalidate one signed with an outside agency.
See Gray, supra note 16, at 119-20.
123. Gray, supra note 16, at 131. For this to result, the Court would have to find
that the cases are not analogous. This is unlikely because it would be inconsistent.
Workers who signed agreements with third parties would be able to arbitrate whereas
employers could not enforce similar provisions. Knight, supra note 16, at 253.
124. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. The Court did not decide this issue because the
arbitration agreement was part of the securities registration application, not part of
Gilmer's contract with his employer. Id, The dissent, however, would have found that
the FAA did not apply to employment contracts of any workers, thus providing no
bias for compelling arbitration. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. See Knight, supra note 16, at 251.
126. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 884; see also Berger, supra note 31, at
708-09; King et al., supra note 31, at 110-11; Knight, supra note 16, at 252 (due to
the liberal public policy favoring arbitration); see, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery
Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1160 (1985) (FAA did not exclude contracts of employment of brewery workers
because they are not involved in the transportation industry); Stokes v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 523 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1975); Erving v. Virginia
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) (FAA did not exclude
contract of professional basketball player); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785
(1st Cir. 1971) (account executive's contract covered by the FAA); Tenney Eng'g v.
United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 451-53 (3d Cir.
1953) (FAA excludes only those workers actually involved in moving goods inter-
state); Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1438-39 (N.D. IlM. 1993)
(the FAA covered an attorney's partnership agreement); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins.
Co., 827 F. Supp. 76, 78-79 (D. Mass. 1993) (the FAA covers insurance agent's em-
ployment contract); Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303, 307 (E.D. Mo. 1993) ("FAA
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The rationale behind these cases is that if Congress had intended to
exclude a/l contracts of employment, it would have been unnecessary
to have specifically named certain classes in the statute as examples;
since such classes were enumerated, clearly only these types of work-
ers were meant to be excluded.' Despite a limited number of deci-
sions classifying employment contracts outside the securities industry,
most courts have indicated that employment contracts will not fall
within the contracts of employment exception of the FAA.I There-
fore, the remainder of this Comment proceeds on the assumption that
the FAA will be applicable to most non-union employment contracts.'
is applicable to nonunion employment contracts involving workers who are not in-
volved in the transportation industry"); DiCrisci v. Lincoln Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp.
947, 952-53 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (contract of bank operations manager covered by the
FAA); In re Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc. & Nebel, 765 F. Supp. 419, 422 (N.D.
Ohio 1991) (arbitration clauses in non union account executives employment contracts
are enforceable under the FAA); Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832, 833-
34 (E.D. Pa. 1991), offd, 972 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1992) (arbitration clause in accoun-
tant partnership agreement is enforceable under the FAA); Hydrick v. Management
Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 1434, 1435 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (FAA did not exclude
contract of employment of employee of personnel placement agency); Malison v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 101, 104 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (FAA did not ex-
clude contract of stockbroker); Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 148 F.
Supp. 521, 523 (S.D.N.Y.), ad, 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
932 (1958) (contracts of plant worker are subject to the FAA).
However, an expansive reading of the FAA claiming that all employment affects
commerce such that all employment contracts must be excluded from the FAA would
invalidate most contract agreements. Knight, supra note 16, at 252. Some courts have
adopted this view. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311
(6th Cir. 1991) (validating an employee's agreement with the securities industry to
arbitrate because it was not a "contract of employment," but any contract with his
employer would be subject to the FAA exclusion); Bacashihua v. United States Postal
Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1988) (FAA not applicable to postal worker as
she is part of a class of workers "engaged in interstate commerce" even though not
personally transporting the goods interstate); United Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers
v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (FAA extends to those
involved in the production of goods to be transported interstate); e. Mago v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1992) (while the contracts
of employment issues was not raised, there was insufficient evidence to determine
the effect of the FAA on broker's a employment contract).
127. See Mathason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 884; see also Berger, supra note 31,
at 708-09.
128. See Berger, supra note 31, at 708. Collective bargaining agreements have been
found to be contracts of employment subject to exclusion by the FAA. Lincoln Mills
of Alabama v. Textile Workers Union of Am., 230 F.2d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd,
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
129. See Knight, supra note 16, at 253; see also supra notes 121-28 and accompany-
1505
b. Which statutory claims can be compelled to be arbitrated?
Gilmer did not conclusively decide which statutory rights can be
contracted out of the jury system by opting for arbitration in an em-
ployment agreement." When the coverage of statutory rights is at is-
sue (usually because the contract states nothing about their inclusion
or exclusion), the Supreme Court held that the burden is on the party
opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude the
waiver of judicial remedies for those rights at issue.' Therefore, if an
employment contract says nothing as to the arbitration of statutory
claims, arbitration of these claims will be allowed unless judicial intent
not to have them arbitrated can be shown."n
c. Expanding Gilmer's holding to mandate arbitration of statutory
claims other than those covered by the ADEA
Since the Gilmer decision, courts have expanded Gilmer's applica-
tion of the FAA to include arbitration of statutory rights arising under
Title VII,'- ERISA ' and the EPPA." Future extensions of the
ing text.
130. From Gilmer, it is only clear that securities industry employees must arbitrate
ADEA claims if they have signed an agreement to arbitrate all claims. Gilmer v. In-
terstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
131. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1984) (holding that party must show Congress' intent).
Such intent will be found in either the text of the statute, its legislative history or
from conflict between arbitration and the "underlying purposes" of the statute.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. In Gilmer, Gilmer did not meet this burden and thus was
bound to arbitrate his ADEA claim. Id. at 35.
132. Knight, supra note 16, at 257; see supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
Finding judicial intent not to arbitrate will be rare as many statutes say nothing as to
arbitration (thus arbitration is not specifically excluded) and others, such as the ADA
and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, explicitly encourage the use of ADR methods to re-
solve disputes. Section 513 of the ADA states: "Where appropriate and to the extent
authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution including set-
tement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials, and ar-
bitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this Act." 42 U.S.C. § 12212
(West Supp. 1991). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 states: "Where appropriate and to the
extent authorized by law, the use of alternative dispute resolution including ... arbi-
tration, is encouraged to resolve disputes under the Act." Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. I No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1070, 1081 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1994)).
133. See, e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir.
1992) (arbitration of Title VII claim compelled because petitioner failed to prove that
Congress intended to exclude); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698,
700 (lth Cir. 1992) (FAA may compel the arbitration of Title VII cases); Alford v.
Dean Witter, 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (arbitration of Title VII claim compelled in
light of Gilmer); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir.
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Gilmer rule to other statutory rights is probable given the fact that
scholars have noted that Gilmer will likely be expanded to mandate the
arbitration of ADA claims, arising under similar factual circumstances
as Gilmer," and most other statutory claims regarding employment as
well.'
d. Compelling arbitration of statutory claims under state law
While federal policy as to the arbitration of statutory claims is be-
coming more clear, the states have not conclusively established wheth-
er arbitration of statutory claims will be compelled under the states'
arbitration statutes when the FAA is inapplicable.' However, one
scholar has noted that arbitration clauses not covered by the FAA "will
likely be enforceable under state law." " Additionally, as most state ar-
bitration statutes do not contain the contracts of employment exception
and instead "expressly appl[y] to 'agreements between employers and
employees'"; compelling arbitration of statutory rights under the state
statutes is likely.'" In addition, several state courts have relied on
1991) (Title VII claims can be compelled under FAA).
134. See, e.g., Fabian Fin. Servs. v. Kurt H. Volk, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 768 F.
Supp. 728, 733-34 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (ERISA claim compelled to arbitration under FAA).
135. See, e.g., Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 877, 881
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1992) (statutory claim arising under EPPA
was compelled to arbitration in light of clause in Civil Rights Act of 1991 encourag-
ing ADR)
136. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 171. This result is likely since § 513 of
the ADA expressly discusses the use of alternative dispute resolution. Id,
137. New Trends, supra note 31, at 14. This extension is likely because the reason-
ing applied in Gilmer (that a person is merely having his claim heard in a different
forum) is applicable to other statutory rights as well. Id; see also, Bales, supra note
20, at 1899; William Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated Arbitration,
48 ARE. J. 27, 33 (-[It is difficult to envision any type of statutory claim . . . that
would not be subject to binding arbitration."); Husband & Mumaugh, supra note 63,
at 2278-79; Knight, supra note 15, at 255-56 ("[Ilf ADEA and Title VII claims are not
exempt from arbitration agreements it is hard to imagine a statute that would be
exempt."); Malin & Ladenson, supra note 58, at 1201.
138. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 888. In maling this assertion, Mathiason
& Uppal refer specifically to the California Arbitration Act (CAA). Id. However, they
previously noted that most state statutes are similar to California's; thus, the discus-
sion has a broad application. Id. at 887. But see King et al., supra note 31, at 115
("[Sitates have enacted arbitration statutes to enforce many of the agreements not
subject to the FAA.").
139. King et al., supra note 31, at 116.
140. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 888. This result is also likely due to the
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Gilmer in upholding agreements to arbitrate. "' Therefore, whether by
federal statute or by state provision, most employment related contracts
requiring arbitration of claims cover statutory claims normally guaran-
teed a jury trial. "2 Since an employee will forfeit the right to a jury
trial by agreeing to arbitrate, employees should be fully informed of this
result before signing."
3. Arbitrator Bias
Bias in the arbitrator's decision may result from three primary forces:
manifest bias,4 4 superior knowledge of award patterns by one
party" or repeat usage of an institutional arbitrator. " In multiple
panel arbitrations, where each party chooses an arbitrator and then the
two party arbitrators choose a neutral third arbitrator, it has been
found that the party arbitrators are expected to be biased toward their
side and any finding of bias on their part is not grounds to vacate an
award unless corruption is present. 7 As a result, this Comment is on-
ly concerned with the possibility of bias on behalf of neutral arbitrators
in the multi-party arbitration panel scenario. For single panel arbitra-
tions, this Comment relates to all possible arbitrators.
a. Manifest bias
This species of bias is found when an arbitrator fails to disclose what
is required and his failure results in grounds to vacate the award." It
has been found that failing to disclose relationships which create "an
impression of possible bias" results in cause to vacate an arbitration
award even if no actual fraud or bias is charged against the arbitra-
tor." Case law has established that personal relationships alone do
fact that the CAA promotes a public policy favoring arbitration much as the FAA
does. Id. at 887.
141. See, e.g., Spellman v. Securities, Annuities & Ins. Servs., Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d
427, 431-34 (Ct App. 1992); Skewes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 829 P.2d 874, 877-78
(Kan. 1992); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc, 584 N.Y.S.2d 838, 839.40 (1992),
qffd, 81 N.Y.2d 623, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993).
142. See supra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
143. See ifra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
144. See inf-a notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
147. Tate v. Sarasota Say. and Loan, 265 Cal. Rptr. 440, 448 (Ct. App. 1989).
148. See id
149. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-49
(1968). This standard was established to ensure that parties opting out of the jury
system received the same protection they would have received had they not opted
out. Id. at 148.
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not create "an impression of possible bias" and do not have to be dis-
closed.'" However, as to business relationships, which must be dis-
closed, numerous interpretations of "an impression of possible bias"
have been voiced such that determining what must be disclosed by an
arbitrator is difficult'' In California, for example, courts interpreting
the Commonwealth Coatings standard have come up with five separate
definitions of "an impression of possible bias."' As such, proving the
existence of manifest bias in business relationships is a formidable task
b. Superior knowledge of arbitrator awards by one party
Bias that warrants vacating of an award does not always result from
an arbitrator favoring one particular party over another.'" Instead,
large employers who are frequent participants in the arbitration process
may take to "tracking" arbitrators to find out information regarding the
amount of the potential arbitrators' past awards.' Consequently, that
employer may have an unfair advantage over an employee because the
employer has the resources necessary to gain information pertinent to
the selection of a favorable arbitrator, resulting in bias toward the
employer's side.'"
150. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club of S. Cal., 148 Cal.
Rptr. 282, 285 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that personal relationships between attorneys
do not create an "impression of possible bias" because it is reasonable that attorneys
who work in the same area will know each other and thus do not need to be dis-
closed); San Luis Obispo Bay Properties Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 104 Cal.
Rptr. 733, 741 (Ct. App. 1972) ("{Mlembership in the same professional organization is
in itself hardly a credible basis for inferring even an impression of bias."). Both cases
rely on Commonwealth Coatings in finding that personal dealings alone do not need
to be disclosed by arbitrators.
151. See Matthew David Disco, The Impression of Possible Bias: What Neutral Ar-
bitrators Must Disclose in California, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 113, 136 (1993).
152. Id. Disco summarizes the five interpretations of "an impression of possible
bias" as: (1) "(a] substantial business relationship," (2) "indication of favoritism or un-
usual preference," (3) "significant or substantial contacts," (4) "independent
contractor-business relationship," and (5) "relationship that may lead arbitrator to
place unusual trust or confidence in one side or the other." Id. at 136.
153. See infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
154. See Berger, supra note 31, at 697. Frequent participants in the arbitration pro-
cess are referred to as "repeat players." See id, Although unintentional on the part of
the arbitrator, such status still can be classified under "bias" because it may affect
the award process.
155. For an employer who uses arbitration frequently, names and awards of arbitra-
tors would likely be more easily accessible than to an employee who probably has
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c. Repeat usage of institutional arbitrators
Bias among arbitrators may also result from repeat usage of a partic-
ular institutional arbitration company." Many employers provide for
the use of arbitrators selected from an institutional dispute resolution
service in their employment contracts. 7 When an employer does so,
the implication is that this dispute resolution service will get a substan-
tial amount of business from the employer, thus leading to an inference
of partiality." The employee may realize that there is some sort of
relationship between the two, however, she may not grasp the full ex-
tent of the financial consequences of such a union."
While the employer may not outright expect the service to provide
favorable resolutions, the service is reaping financial benefits from
providing arbitrators to the employer and, for fear of jeopardizing this
relationship, may err on the side of the employer when deciding dis-
putes." This is especially true since employers not satisfied with the
results may very well switch from one service to a different ser-
vice-there is nothing to keep a company from "arbitrator shop-
ping. ' Thus, if employees keep winning, even though the arbitrators
have proceeded in a neutral manner, there may be some incentive for
an institutional arbitrator to sporadically, "throw in" a win for the em-
ployer to remain in the employer's good graces.'
B. Employer Concerns
1. Potential for Defending More Claims
Employers also need to be aware of the consequences. of including
standard binding arbitration provisions in their employment con-
not arbitrated before. See id
156. See Dick, supra note 14, at 55.
157. C. Disco, supra note 151, at 138 (referring to institutional providers adopted
by banks to settle disputes, but applicable in the employment context as well).
158. Dick, supra note 14, at 55.
159. Cf. Disco, supra note 151, at 143 (referring to the banking context, but equally
applicable in the employment context).
160. Thomas, supra note 79, at 795-96; see also Disco, supra note 151, at 138. But
see Berger, supra note 31, at 715 (noting that arbitrators wanting to increase their
possibilities for selection for future arbitrations will not favor either side).
161. See Berger, supra note 31, at 715.
162. Id. However, if the employee is constantly losing, there is no such incentive
for the arbitrator to give the employee a win because the employee has no power to
switch the institutional arbitrator provided in the contract. And, while the employer is
not necessarily encountering the same arbitrator every time, it is likely that the arbi-
trators working for the institution have knowledge of each of the employer's cases.
This knowledge may affect their decisions.
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tracts.' The most prevalent concern for employers is that, by allow-
ing employees to bypass the court system, employees who might have
been hesitant to file a lawsuit'" may be more likely to pursue claims
against their employer in arbitration, thus increasing the ultimate num-
ber of claims to be defended.' This result, however, may be offset by
the likelihood that the ultimate awards actually recovered by individual
employees will be less than what would have been received at trial.'s
Thus, even with more claims being arbitrated, the total cost to the em-
ployer may still be decreased. 7
2. Unionization
Another concern to be considered by employers contemplating the
implementation of arbitration procedures is that unhappy employees
may unionize.'" The courts have not, and probably will not, extend
the Gilmer decision to union situations.1" As such, the Supreme
Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverM is still valid.'' In
163. See infra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
164. The reasons an employee may be inhibited in bringing a lawsuit include cost
and emotional strain. See supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text (listing the bene-
fits of arbitration and the corresponding disadvantages of trial).
165. Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 514; see also Husband & Mumaugh, supra
note 63, at 2279; Mathason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 896. Besides increasing the
number of legitimate suits, easy access to arbitration may also increase the number
of frivolous claims. Alfred G. Feliu, Alternative Dispute Resolution. Pe-Dispute Arbi-
tration Agreements As An Alternative to Employment Litigation, in HANDLING COR-
PORATE EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS 1991, at 525, 532 (PU Lltg. & Admin. Practice Hand-
book Series No. 410, 1991).
166. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing the differences in the
amount of arbitration awards versus jury verdicts).
167. See supra notes 61-68, 77-79 (the combination of speed and lower cost should
result in a lower overall cost for the employer who arbitrates).
168. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 897.
169. Due to the special circumstances of collective bargaining, it is likely that non-
union cases and union cases will remain distinct. See Gray, supra note 16, at 123;
Knight, supra note 15, at 256 (The interests of an individual employee may be sub-
ordinated to the collective interests of all employees... arbitration of statutory
claims could thus be appropriate under an individual employment contract but inap-
propriate under a collective bargaining agreement.").
170. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
171. See Klroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 34 ('Gilmer does not alter the rule that
an arbitration ruling interpreting a collective bargaining agreement would not bar a
later suit based on the civil rights laws."). But see Knight, supra note 16, at 255
(Gilmer "casts doubt" on Aleander).
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Alexander, the Court held that unionized employees under labor con-
tracts are free to pursue statutory claims in court following unsuccess-
ful arbitrations."
Consequently, forming a labor union may be the only viable option
employees have to ensure their ability to pursue a court adjudication of
statutory rights following an unsatisfactory arbitration.'" If employees
do organize, the advantages an employer anticipated from implementing
arbitration procedures will be defeated."
C. Concerns of Those in the Legal Profession
1. Retreat From the Common Law System
The legal profession in general should also be concerned with the
impact of the current heavy reliance on arbitration for employment
disputes." The increased usage of binding arbitration to resolve em-
ployment disputes could result in "a detrimental impact on the develop-
ment of substantive statutory law at the appellate level," since arbitra-
tions do not have to follow precedent and carry no precedential value
themselves.' The lack of judicial precedent leaves arbitrators free to
decide cases as they please, without having to consider the applicable
172. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59. In Alexander, Gardner-Denver allegedly discharged
Alexander for producing defective parts. 415 U.S. at 38. Pursuant to his union agree-
ment, Alexander then filed a grievance claiming he was unjustly discharged. Id. at 39.
He did not claim racial discrimination at this time. Id. The arbitration provision in ef-
fect for union grievances provided that the decision of the arbitrator was to be final
and binding on all participants. Id. at 41-42. Before the arbitration began, Alexander
claimed racial discrimination. Id at 42. The arbitrator found that Alexander had been
properly discharged without mentioning the racial discrimination claim. Id. at 42.
Alexander then filed a civil action in civil court charging racial discrimination under
TItle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 43 In holding that Alexander was not
precluded from pursuing his claim in court subsequent to the arbitration, the Court
relied on the nature of the collective bargaining arrangement Id. at 59-60.
In holding that Alexander was not binding in Gilmer, the Court relied on the
special circumstances of the collective bargaining arrangement which were not pres-
ent in Gilmer. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35.
173. Gray, supra note 16, at 115.
174. See supra notes 58-98 and accompanying text. If an employer wants to avoid
this result, a provision could be included in the arbitration agreement specifically
excluding arbitration of statutory claims. Parties are basically free to tailor their con-
tracts to their individual needs. See Brunet, supra note 74, at 103 ("Specific, custom-
ized contracts to arbitrate permit the parties to chart their dispute resolution
course.").
175. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
176. Gray, supra note 16, at 134; see also Thomas, supra note 79, at 795 ("The
outcome [of an arbitration] affects only the individuals bringing the action.").
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substantive law in making their decisions'7 or worry about the rami-
fications of their decisions.'" In addition, for employment cases that
do proceed to trial, there will be relatively little case law for the judges
to consider as the numerous arbitrated cases carry no precedential val-
ue." Similarly, the judge's resulting decisions will be of little value, as
arbitrators presented with similar cases in the future will not be bound
to abide by these decisions.ln As such, without modification, binding
arbitration as currently practiced may well serve to weaken the com-
mon law system as it has developed."
2. Inadequacy of Procedures
Professionals are now beginning to realize that "[t]he question is no
longer whether ADR should be used, but precisely how, under whose
direction, and according to what checks and balances"."f These pro-
fessionals recognize that there is potential for inadequacy and abuse of
the process, but remain optimistic that with procedures in place to en-
sure that the system is beneficial to all, binding arbitration can with-
stand challenge. The courts also have recognized the need for proce-
dural protection. For example, the Supreme Court, in Gilmer, upheld
the agreement to arbitrate in part because the rules adopted by the
NYSE provided adequate procedural safeguards.' Indeed, if these
were not in place, the outcome of Gilmer would likely have been differ-
ent."' It has been recognized that "the courts have expressed their
confidence in the ability of arbitration to safeguard statutory rights, the
task [now] is to guarantee that such confidence is well placed."" To
177. Brunet, supra note 74, at 85.
178. Thomas, supra note 79, at 794.
179. See icL
180. See Gray, supra note 16, at 134
181. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text
182. Dick, supra note 14, at 47 (emphasis added).
183. See Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 270 ("Unless all of us work together in sup-
port of ADR and, particularly, final and binding arbitration, our adversarial system of
dispute resolution will surely breakdown."); see also Berger, supra note 31, at 721;
Green, supra note 1, at WL9; King, et al., supra note 31, at 102 (noting that any
deficiencies resulting from informality can be dealt with by "designing an appropriate
arbitral system").
184. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-35 (1991).
185. See id,
186. Dick supra note 14, at 54.
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fulfill this guarantee, both the method of implementation' 7 and the ar-
bitration process itself will need modification."
IV. VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE IN LIGHT OF THE
INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER
IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
Under the FAA, "arbitration agreements shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."89 Additionally, for statutory rights,
arbitration agreements will generally be invalidated only when intended
to be precluded by statute."0 Given that employees often do not real-
ize they are forfeiting valuable rights by opting out of the jury sys-
tem,'"' the courts should recognize another less restrictive method to
invalidate arbitration contracts signed by uninformed employees. Three
such methods are detailed in this Comment. The first, contracts of ad-
hesion, has attempted to invalidate arbitration agreements in the past,
but has generally failed."u The second, preponderance of the evidence,
is a broader mechanism for invalidating arbitration agreements, howev-
er it may prove to be too restrictive." The last, totality of the circum-
stances, seems a fair method of determining whether an employer valid-
ly obtained informed consent to an arbitration agreement.'
A. Contracts of Adhesion: A Failed Approach
The courts have generally assumed that if an arbitration agreement
has been signed, the clause was bargained for and consequently will be
upheld under the FAA." This is partly due to the fact that people are
responsible for reading what they sign, whether they actually do so or
not." Further, it has been recognized that mere inequality of bargain-
187. See infra notes 273-319 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 320-401 and accompanying text
189. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)).
190. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text
191. See infra notes 233-68 and accompanying text
192. See infra notes 195-214 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 221-72 and accompanying text.
195. Green, supra note 1, at WL2; see, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke Inc.,
841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988); N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., 548 F.2d 722 (8th
Cir. 1976).
196. Green, supra note 1, at WL13. 'There is no unfairness in expecting parties to
read contracts before they sign them." Cohen, 841 F.2d at 286487.
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ing power is not enough to make such a contract unenforceable-some
sort of fraud or coercion must also be present."
However, as an industry adopts arbitration as its favored method of
resolving disputes, an employee may not have a "mere inequality of
bargaining power," but a lack of bargaining power altogether.", A per-
son cannot always pass up one job to avoid an arbitration provision
and accept employment with another company, as all potential employ-
ers may have similar provisions."' Such a situation has been recog-
nized as a contract of adhesion: regardless of where one turns for a
more favorable option, there is none.m Federal law, however, does
not recognize state adhesion law principles; thus, this concept does not
provide a defense to the enforcement of an arbitration clause under the
FAA."I For the few instances when the FAA does not apply, state law
adhesion principles are not preempted and do, presumably, bar the
arbitration clause from taking effect if proven.'
197. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). Since the FAA
intended for arbitration contracts to be put on equal footing with other contracts,
only such grounds as exist to invalidate contracts will invalidate an arbitration clause
in a contract Id. Since inequality of bargaining power may, in some circumstances,
be reason to invalidate a contract, cases must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
I In Gi/mer, while Gilmer may have been unequal in bargaining power, there was
.no indication ... that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or defraud-
ed into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration application." Id.; see also
Husband & Mumaugh, supra note 63, at 2279 ("[lit appears that absent fraud or un-
due influence, the agreement will be given effect.").
198. See infra notes 199-214 and accompanying text.
199. For example, it is now standard in the securities industry to require arbitration
for all claims. See Howard, supra-note 137, at 33 (noting that arbitration of claims is
dominant over court adjudication in the resolution of securities disputes). Outside the
employment context, it has been noted that as more and more banks impose arbitra-
tion provisions on their customers, there may come a point at which no bank will be
without an arbitration provision. Green, supra note 1, at WL5.
200. Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960).
201. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 885 (citing Mago v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Husband & Mumaugh, supra note
63, at 2279 (suggesting that agreements will be upheld even when given on a "take it
or leave it" basis); see, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (holding that the FAA
preempts the California Labor Code) (1987). But see Knight, supra note 16, at 258
("[T]he words of the FAA itself do not require the exclusion of state contract law. In
fact, the language of [FAA § 21 ... arguably contemplates the use of state contract
law to defeat some arbitration agreements.").
202. See Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cr. 1991).
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For circumstances in which state law adhesion contract principles
are applicable, recognition of the contract as one of adhesion does not
automatically dictate that it is unenforceable. 2' The existence of a
contract of adhesion results in its being reviewed more closely, and the
provision becomes unenforceable only if some sort of unconscionability
is found.' Consequently, employment contracts are treated no differ-
ent than any other contract when adhesion concepts are raised.m
Due to inequality of bargaining power, distinctions between higher
level employees and lower level employees may determine whether an
adhesion contract is found.' An arbitration contract signed by a high-
er level employee is less likely to be considered unenforceable than one
signed by a lower level employee.' As such, an employer should con-
sider these distinctions when deciding whether to implement binding
arbitration agreements for all employees." Employers may prefer to
avoid challenges to the arbitration clause by only implementing the
provision as to higher level employees who are more likely to bring a
suit and who are likely to be given larger awards.' Since lower level
employees are less likely to bring suit in the first place, and less likely
to draw significant damages,"' the employer may prefer to allow these
cases to go to court, while simultaneously arbitrating those cases that
may prove more financially disastrous."1 '
203. Factors to be considered when determining whether an arbitration agreement
amounts to a contract of adhesion are:
the experience and competence of the contracting employee; the extent to
which the employee negotiated other terms in the contract; whether the con-
tract provision falls within the reasonable expectations of the employee;
whether the contract designates an arbitrator who, by reason of status or
identity, is presumptively biased; and the clarity of the agreement.
Knight, supra note 16, at 258.
204. See Gray, supra note 16, at 129.
205. Id.
206. See Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172.
207. Id.
208. See Dee, supra note 58, at 406-07. See also Allison & Stahihut, supra note 58,
at 172 (discussing the manner in which to implement arbitration procedures for dif-
ferent level employees).
209. This conclusion is based on the assumption that higher level employees would
be more knowledgeable as to their rights and would command higher salaries than
lower level employees.
210. Generally, lower level employees will have lower salaries and therefore they
will have less of an incentive to pursue a claim in court.
211. This would reduce the likelihood that an arbitration clause was forced upon an
employee with unequal bargaining power while at the same time allowing the employ-
er to reduce overall litigation costs. As such, employee and employer concerns are
accommodated
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A contract is also more likely to be found adhesive when the arbitra-
tion agreement is unclear as to which disputes will be arbitrated."'
When an arbitration agreement is ambiguous as to which disputes will
be covered, and the agreement is found to be adhesive, the ambiguities
will be subject to stricter construction against the party with the stron-
ger bargaining power."3 However, this result is rare, as employees do
not often prevail on claims of adhesion contracts 1
B. Preponderance of the Evidence: A Burdensome Approach
The preponderance of the evidence approach to invalidating arbitra-
tion agreements, advocated by Jeffrey Stempel, begins with the premise
that all written agreements should be enforced."2 The subject matter
and legal claims involved are not considered relevant.' The burden of
production and persuasion will fall on the party opposing arbitra-
tion.2"7 Only if that party can show, by the preponderance of the evi-
dence, that consent to the arbitration clause was not obtained will the
agreement to arbitrate be invalidated. 8 According to the proponent of
212. If an arbitration clause is ambiguous, it makes good sense to review it more
closely to see if any unconscionability is found by its inclusion. See note 204 and
accompanying text.
213. Victoria v. Superior Court, 710 P.2d 833, 837 (Cal. 1985).
214. Knight, supra note 16, at 258.
215. Jeffrey Stemple, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TuL. L REV. 1377, 1426
(1991).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1427.
218. Id. Determining free consent will focus on the amount of disclosure as to the
arbitration provision given to the employee and the level of the employee's knowl-
edge as to the provision. Stemple states five theories under which a contract could
be invalidated:
(1) Blameless Ignorance. The opponent was not adequately aware of the
arbitration clause or the nature of arbitration as opposed to litigation, made
reasonable efforts to acquire sufficient awareness, and would not have con-
sented to a contract with the instant arbitration clause if he were aware of
the differences between arbitration and litigation;
(2) Dirty-Dealing. The arbitration agreement or the contract as a whole was
procured through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion and the objecting par-
ty cannot be said to have constructively consented to arbitration.
(3) Inescapable Adhesion. The arbitration clause is part of a contract of ad-
hesion and the subject matter of the contract is vital to contemporary human
existence, similar to those things that the law of contracting by minors has
traditionally labeled as "necessary," and the opponent had no reasonable
means of obtaining the good or service or its substantial equivalent from
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this system, such an approach would be consistent with the federal
policy favoring arbitration while at the same time providing a mecha-
nism by which employees can "avoid arbitration in unjust circumstanc-
es."21' While this approach may be feasible, the burden of persuasion
may be too difficult to overcome, and thus a less restrictive approach
may be more desirable when determining whether an arbitration agree-
ment was truly bargained for.'m
C. Totality of the Circumstances: A More Plausible Approach
Due to the shortcomings and limited application of both the contracts
of adhesion approach"' and the preponderance of the evidence ap-
proach,' a more plausible means of determining whether an agree-
ment to arbitrate was fully bargained for is to consider the totality of
the circumstances.' This test was first introduced in Coventry v.
United States Steel,- in which the Third Circuit listed several factors
to be considered in determining whether knowing and voluntary con-
sent was obtained.2m This test is valuable because it takes into ac-
count four factors when determining whether true consent was ob-
tained in procuring the arbitration agreement: (1) that the legislative
history of the FAA intended bargaining between parties of equal pow-
er,"e (2) that many people do not know they are giving up valuable
another source;
(4) Substantive Unconscionability. The arbitration forum, system, or chosen
process decreed by the clause is so unreasonably favorable to the drafter as
to be substantively unconscionable that the courts will not enforce the agree-
ment;
(5) Defective Agency. The opponent did not sign the arbitration agreement
and the signer was not an agent of the opponent authorized to commit the
subject matter of the instant dispute to arbitration or, if authorized, breached
its fiduciary duty to the opponent in signing an arbitration agreement of such
breadth.
Id. at 1434-35 (citations omitted).
219. Id. at 1427.
220. See infra notes 221-319 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 195-214.
222. See supra notes 215-20.
223. See infra notes 224-72 and accompanying text.
224. 856 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1988).
225. 1d at 522-23 (citations omitted). In determining whether the arbitration was
bargained for, the Coventry Court listed the following factors to be considered. (1)
the employee's education and experience; (2) the employee's role in deciding the
terms of the release provisions; (3) the clarity of the release provisions; (4) whether
the employee had legal representation; and (5) "whether the consideration given in
exchange for the waiver exceeds employee benefits to which the employee was al-
ready entitled by contract or law." Id. at 523 (citations omitted).
226. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
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rights by agreeing to arbitration;' (3) that the realities of unemploy-
ment may prevent true consent;m and (4) that employers should be
held accountable for obtaining a knowing and voluntary consent to the
arbitration contract. '
1. Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act
The need for a totality of the circumstances test is evident by looking
at the procedural history of the FAA. As Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent in Gilmer, the FAA was originally intended to encourage arbi-
tration between merchants of equal bargaining power.' As such, ap-
plying the FAA to employment contracts between unequal parties was
not anticipated.' Therefore, applying the same standard to invalidate
contracts resulting from equal bargaining power, to invalidate arbitra-
tion agreements in the employment context is inappropriate.'
2. Knowledge of Rights
The need for a totality of the circumstances test to determine wheth-
er the contract containing the arbitration provision was bargained for
becomes particularly evident when considering that employees often do
not know what rights they are giving up when they first sign the con-
tract' The rights given up may include a jury trial,' opportunity to
227. See infr notes 233-58 and accompanying text.
228. See irfru notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 266-72 and accompanying text.
230. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 38-39 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
231. See id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. See Green, supra note 1, at WL6.
233. Brunet, supra note 74, at 106 ("[W]e can speculate confidently that only a few
customers realize that signing the arbitration clause specifically waives constitutional
rights during arbitration.") (referring to a broker-customer relationship, but applying
equally to an employer-employee relationship); see also Andrew Kielkopf, Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: An Employee Perspective, 22 CAP. U. L REv. 803, 830
(1993) (noting that "[iln America, everyone feels entitled to have his or her case
heard by a judge and, where appropriate, a jury of peers. In fact, very few people
realize that by signing such an agreement, violations will be sent to an arbitration
paneL").
234. See infm notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
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appeal,'s discovery,'s and compliance with the rules of evidence.'
a. Jury Trial
The employee may not be aware that she is giving up her right to a
jury trial, or may know this fact but may not realize the ramifications of
this action.' It is unlikely that an employee will know that his chanc-
es of recovery and the possibility for a high award are usually greater in
a jury trial than in arbitration.' The employee probably will also not
realize that, by giving up their right to a trial, the employer has less to
fear in terms of negative publicity and accordingly may have less of an
incentive to act fairly toward the employee.' This decreased incentive
may result in employers being less concerned with their actions, there-
by putting the employees at more of a risk of having a dispute arise in
the first place."'
b. Appeal
The employee also may not realize that an arbitrator's award is a
final decision which cannot be appealed.' A stranger to arbitration is
likely to perceive an arbitration award to be as appealable as a court
judgment.' Even if the contract contains the term "binding," it cannot
235. See infra notes 242-47 and accompanying text
236. See infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
237. See inlfa notes 254-56 and accompanying text
238. See infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text
239. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussing the differences in
jury awards versus arbitrator awards); see also Husband & Mumaugh, supra note 63,
at 2279 (stating that employees should be aware of this result).
240. Thomas, supra note 79, at 795 ("[A]rbitration may shield unfair employers from
public accountability."). But see Spefogel, supra note 23, at 269 (noting that ADR
"forc[es] supervisors to act more reasonably, consistently and in accordance with
established company policies and practices").
241. See Thomas, supra note 79, at 795 (an employer is not as likely to change its
unfair practices if not many people are aware of them). But see Spelfogel, supra
note 23, at 269 (arguing that implementation of arbitration makes employers more
accountable for their actions and more fair to employees).
242. Brunet, supra note 74, at 87 ("[Tjhere is no true appeal from an arbitral
award."); see also Feliu, supra note 165, at 533 ("appeal rights are limited"); supra
notes 105-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Moncharsh holding that an arbi-
tral award cannot be appealed even when based on erroneous fact or law).
243. As arbitration is not yet a familiar process to many people, employees cannot
be assumed to know the procedural dynamics associated with this method of dispute
resolution. Indeed, it has been noted that "[t]he ultimate [arbitral] decision, however,
is at least as final as that reached by a court of law." Berger, supra note 31, at 696
(citations omitted). As most know that a final decision from a court of law can be
appealed even though it is also "binding," there is no reason to suppose participants
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be assumed that the average employee has knowledge of legal
terms.' It is also highly improbable that an employee would assume
that an arbitrator could apply the wrong law or ignore legal precedent
altogether when resolving an employment dispute.' However, given
the Moncharsh decision that arbitration awards cannot be appealed
even when there are errors of fact or law, this is an entirely plausible
scenario.' Since there is no recourse for errors in an arbitration
which would normally result in sufficient cause for an appeal in the
court system, the circumstances of the individual should certainly be
considered when determining whether arbitration agreements involved
bargaining. ?A
c. Discovery
Another right that employees are probably not aware they may lose
when they sign an arbitration agreement is discovery.' The concept
of discovery in arbitration is generally limited,' which has significant
consequences for the employee.'s An employer will generally have a
personnel file and will retain access to this information in the event of
an arbitration." The employee is not likely to keep records of employ-
ment related matters and may consequently be hindered by discovery
rules in arbitration which may prevent her access to her own personnel
fle.' By contrast, if the dispute had gone to court, it is virtually cer-
would not expect the same from a "binding" arbitration.
244. An employee would likely believe that a court ruling is "binding" as well. Since
most laymen believe that appeals are an inevitable part of the legal process, there is
no reason to expect someone to think any different of the arbitration process.
245. As the most often cited advantages of arbitration are speed and reduced cost,
a more probable assumption on the part of the employee is that arbitration is the
same as court-just less expensive and time-consuming because participants do not
have to "wait in line" for a courtroom. See supra notes 58-98 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
248. See ifra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
249. Dee, supra note 58, at 390 ("Typically there is no discovery in arbitration.").
But see Berger, supra note 31, at 720 (arguing that "discovery limitations . . . are in
fact more imagined than real" because arbitrators can be given the power to compel
the production of relevant documents); Husband & Mumaugh, supra note 63, at 2279
(arguing that both parties benefit from "the relaxed procedures").
250. See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
251. In the event that an employer does not keep personnel files, this discussion
may not be applicable. However, common sense dictates that most companies, even
small businesses, will have some sort of file on the employee.
252. See Thomas, supra note 79, at 795 (The complainant in an arbitration "is typi-
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tain that this same information would have to be produced through
court-mandated discovery procedures.'
d. Compliance with the rules of evidence
As with discovery, evidence rules are also relaxed in arbitration pro-
ceedings.'s Television has inundated people with visions of lawyers
raising grandiose objections to the presentation of evidence and witness
testimony during trial. However, most people probably do not realize
that these same comments or items of evidence that would be excluded
in court at the objection of the opposing lawyer will generally be admis-
sible in arbitration, provided they are the least bit relevant.' As a
consequence, an employee cannot be assured that prejudicial evidence
will be excluded from an arbitration.'
Therefore, some of the procedural protections built into the legal
system are not available for arbitrations, leaving an unknowledgable
participant vulnerable."' As a result of many uniformed parties signing
arbitration clauses in their employment contracts, courts should be
reluctant to enforce such provisions "without examining carefully the
factual background and prior dispute resolution experience of the par-
ties. " '
3. Reality of Unemployment
Another compelling argument in favor of considering the totality of
the circumstances arises from the typically dismal employment
cally not given the right to engage in extensive discovery or compel production of
documents.") (citations omitted).
253. Such documents would be required to be produced as discovery under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Some believe discovery is not that great of a problem in
arbitration because it can be written into the arbitration agreement that employer
files be turned over prior to any arbitration hearing. King et al., supra note 31, at
102. But, while this protection is possible, it is not available if the employee does
not know what to look for in the agreement and the employer has not included this
provision. Thus, until it becomes more common to include such discovery provisions
in arbitration agreements, employees may suffer a handicap.
254. See inf-ra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
255. New Trends, supra note 31, at 13. See also Sapp v. Barenfleld, 212 P.2d 233,
237 (Cal. 1949) (noting that any relevant evidence may be admitted as long as the
arbitration hearing is fairly conducted).
256. See New Trends, supra note 31, at 13. But see Husband & Mumaugh, supra
note 63, at 2279 (stating that both parties benefit from "less restrictive evidentiary
issues").
257. See supra notes 233-56 and accompanying text.
258. Brunet, supra note 74, at 104.
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rates.' It has been noted that "where job markets are competitive,
employees should have the economic ability and leverage either to bar-
gain with employers about the terms of an acceptable arbitration
agreement or to choose an employer who does not require arbitra-
tion." ' A major assumption made by this assertion, however, is that
employees have choices among employers."
The assumption regarding job choice is neutralized by the fact that,
"[for individual employees, consent to arbitration may be more formal
than real for all but the most financially secure and sought-after work-
ers.' Consequently, an employee will likely release her right to court
adjudication by agreeing to the mandatory arbitration provision in order
to find a job or retain her current position.'m Unfortunately, in a job
market characterized by high unemployment, people will often do any-
thing to secure a job and are not really negotiating at arm's length
when faced with arbitration provisions in their employment con-
tracts.'m Further, employees generally do not anticipate the possibility
of a dispute with their employer when they first obtain a job, making it
unlikely that they would pay significant attention to any arbitration
clause included in their contract.'
4. Employer Accountability for Obtaining True Consent
Some scholars believe that the totality of circumstances test should
not be used because it reduces the finality of disputes going to arbitra-
tion for solution.' On the other hand, one scholar has noted, "[b]y
259. See infva notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
260. King et al., supra note 31, at 103.
261. Common sense dictates that when unemployment is high such options are
unrealistic.
262. Stempel, supra note 215, at 1387. Because "people want to eat first and con-
sider legal and philosophical implications later[, . .. [tihe average worker in need of
a job is unlikely, at the outset, to balk at an arbitration clause." Id.
263. See Klelkopf, supra note 233, at 830.
264. Id
265. Berger, supru note 31, at 713.
266. King et al., supra note 31, at 119. These scholars anticipate that employers will
not be willing to encourage the use of arbitration because of the fear that the agree-
ment will easily be ruled invalid through this test if the employee so chooses. I&
This should not be a concern for employers if they have taken the proper steps to
ensure that the process of implementing arbitration for their employment disputes is
fair, it is only a concern when the employer has done something unfair. See supra
notes 195-214 and accompanying text.
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looking at the totality of the circumstances, the court can determine
effectively whether the individual knowingly and voluntarily agreed to
waive his substantive rights."' If the court is satisfied that the arbitra-
tion agreement has been implemented in a fair manner, arbitration will
be compelled, ensuring finality of the ultimate decision.' If the court
finds that the totality of the circumstances do not indicate that the
arbitration agreement has been justly implemented, then it will not be
upheld.' In this situation since the employer did not explain the pro-
cedure in enough detail to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of
rights from the employee, the employer should lose the benefit of finali-
ty.' This method still recognizes that a mere inequality of bargaining
power is not enough, in itse I to render an arbitration agreement unen-
forceable." However, when an unequal bargaining situation exists, the
totality of the circumstances approach determines on a case by case
basis whether any other dynamics were at play which would merit
invalidating the arbitration clause. 2
V. PROPOSALS FOR TRUE BARGAINING IN A BINDING
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Taking into consideration the case law and commentary on binding
arbitration agreements in employment contracts, the following propos-
als detail how an employer should implement an arbitration procedure
for disputes so that the employee is provided with a better understand-
ing of the transaction.' The proposals consider four separate situa-
tions: (1) pre-dispute binding arbitration for new hires;27 (2)
pre-dispute binding arbitration for existing employees;76 (3)
267. Green, supra note 1, at WL10. In determining the totality of the circumstances,
the factors Green believes should be considered include: 'the individual's education
and experience, his role in deciding the inclusion or exclusion of the arbitration
clause, the clarity of the terms in the arbitration clause, whether the individual used
legal representation in negotiating the agreement, and whether there was valid con-
sideration given for the release of the right to seek a judicial forum." Id. at WLIO.
268. See id
269. See id.
270. This should only encourage fair practice in the Implementation of arbitration
agreements, resulting in greater finality because no reasons would exist to invalidate
the contract.
271. While the Gi/mer Court did not explicitly name the totality of the circumstanc-
es approach in its decision, this view is nevertheless consistent with the Court's hold-
ing. See Klelkopf, supra note 233, at 824
272. Id,
273. See infra notes 280-319 and accompanying text.
274. See infm notes 280-90 and accompanying text.
275. See inhf notes 291-314 and accompanying text.
1524
[VoL 22: 1485, 19961 Binding Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
pre-dispute tiered dispute resolution procedures for all employees;'B
and (4) post-dispute binding arbitration for all employees.' Following
this section are proposals to ensure fairness in the arbitration proce-
dure itself.' With the combination of true bargaining for arbitration
and fairness in the arbitration process, implementing arbitration as a
method of resolving employment disputes will be a feasible, fair, and
final alternative to court adjudication.'
A. Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration for New Hires
Implementation of an arbitration agreement for employment disputes
is easiest for new employees.' According to one scholar, "a standard-
ized arbitration agreement must not exceed the reasonable expectations
of the employee, as the weaker or adhering party.""M Accordingly, "ad-
equate and reasonable notice" should be given to the employee as to
the "meaning and exact scope of the arbitration agreement and its con-
sequences. " m This should be written in understandable language and
explained to the employee.' Necessarily, this explanation should in-
clude a breakdown of the rights being given up and an explanation
about the non-appealability of the arbitrator's award absent the limited
circumstances dictated by statute.'
This information should be provided when the potential employee
applies for a job so that the person has plenty of time to analyze the
information and understand what to expect as a result of gaining em-
ployment with a particular employer.m  The agreement should also
clearly state which disputes will be settled by arbitration and which, if
any, will not.' To ensure that the employee reads and comprehends
276. See infa note 315 and accompanying text.
277. See ifmra notes 316-19 and accompanying text.
278. See infra notes 280-319 and accompanying text.
279. See Knight, supra note 16, at 259; see also Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58,
at 173.
280. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172; see also Spelfogel, supra note 23, at
263 (stating that Gimer recognized that an arbitration clase is as enforceable as
any other condition of employment such as amount of wages or sick leave).
281. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 890.
282. l
283. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172.
284. These are the problem areas that are not likely to be known. See supra notes
233-58 and accompanying text.
285. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 890; see also Dee, supra note 58, at 407;
Kilroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 36.
286. Dee, supra note 58, at 4080 see also Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58,
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the arbitration agreement, the employer should have her separately sign
an acknowledgment clause.' Finally, the employee should be notified
that she can, and should, seek counsel regarding the arbitration agree-
ment before signing.' As a result, both employee and employer will
be protected should one side subsequently claim a lack of knowl-
edge.' As an alternative, employers could offer the arbitration con-
tract to employees after they have been hired and provide them with
the same consideration given to existing employees in exchange for the
agreement to arbitrate.=m
B. Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration for Existing Employees
A more difficult process of establishing true bargaining for an agree-
ment to arbitrate is encountered when the agreement of an existing
employee must be obtained." Unlike the new employee, the existing
employee was hired without the expectation that disputes would be
subject to arbitration.' There are four methods an employer can uti-
lize to implement binding arbitration for existing employees: (1) indi-
vidually contract with employees;' (2) include the arbitration provi-
sion in an employee handbook;' (3) encourage consent to the agree-
ment based on the "change of forum" argument;' and (4) full disclo-
sure and honesty.'
1. Individually Contracting with Employees
Employers may opt to make individual contracts with their employ-
ees, asking them to acknowledge the new arbitration policy and agree
to be bound by its terms.' This, however, must be supported by inde-
pendent consideration to make the contract valid.' Some courts have
at 173.
287. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172.
288. Dee, supra note 58, at 407. Putting this provision in boldface type is even
more preferable. Kilroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 36
289. King et al., supra note 31, at 121.
290. Gray, supra note 16, at 118; see also Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 268. For a
discussion on adequate consideration, see ifra notes 297-301.
291. See Knight, supra note 16, at 259.
292. Mathlason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 890.
293. See infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 303-07 and accompanying text.
295. See infra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
296. See infra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
297. Mathlason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 890, see also Allison & Stahlhut, supra
note 58, at 172.
298. Mathason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 890, see also Allison & Stahlhut, supra
note 58, at 172.
1526
[VoL 22: 1485, 1995] Binding Arbitration in tMe Non-Union Workplace
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
found that continued employment is sufficient consideration since the
employee could have taken a job elsewhere if she disapproved of the
arbitration provision.a' Other courts have indicated that continued em-
ployment alone is not enough to support a finding of consider-
ation-some increase in benefits must be presented. " This increase in
benefits must be in the form of a promotion or raise that was not al-
ready earned by the employee."' Employers should also provide no-
tice to the employees that the advice of a lawyer can and should be ob-
tained before proceeding and that they have a reasonable period of
time to accept or reject the provision.'
2. Employee Handbook Method
In lieu of individually contracting with each employee for an arbitra-
tion agreement, the employer may choose to impose unilaterally the
arbitration agreement on its employees by adding the policy to employ-
ee handbooks, announcing that the policy is effective for all employees,
providing the employees with a written summnary of the policy in explic-
it language and asking employees to sign an acknowledgment of receipt
of the written policy.' This method, however, is not as desirable as
the previous method,'m and courts will be less likely to consider this a
binding agreement.' It is recognized that "mutual agreement to the
method of resolving disputes is not present" when arbitration is man-
dated in an employer handbook.' Furthermore, this unilateral ap-
299. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Benda, 689 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1982); ISC-Bunker
Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. M. 1990); Lang v. Burlington N.
R.R., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn 1993).
300. Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 268; see e.g., Hollingsworth Smolderless Terminal
Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980); Hull v. Norcom, 750 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir.
1985).
301. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172.
302. Kilroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 36.
303. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 891.
304. Kilroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 36 (stating that "employers should include
such arbitration clauses within an employment contract and not in a personnel manu-
al").
305. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 172-73. This is because it is an opt out
method rather than an opt in method, and people may, for any number of reasons,
fail to opt out and accordingly become bound by the agreement. Id. But see Knight,
supra note 16, at 259 (continued employment after the policy is adopted may provide
the employer with an estoppel argument even if the employee has not specifically
signed the provision).
306. Berger, supra note 31, at 710.
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proach demonstrates only receipt of the policy, not acceptance of its
terms.0
3. Change of Forum Argument
Employers have encouraged employees to sign an arbitration agree-
ment by informing them that they are merely changing the forum to
hear their dispute and that they are not giving up any substantive
rights." However, this is not entirely true. There are situations where
a person has a substantive right to appeal, but forfeits this right by
choosing to arbitrate disputes." In addition, people have the right to
have a jury hear their disputes in certain situations-this is also elimi-
nated when an agreement to arbitrate has been put in place. 0
4. Full Disclosure and Honesty
The best way for an employer to implement an arbitration procedure
is to acknowledge to the employees that they will be forfeiting some
rights by opting out of the jury system. " ' The employer should explain
these rights and note the procedural safeguards enacted to ensure that
the process is fair and reliable." Further, the employer should im-
press upon the employees that any large damage award gained at trial
may be lost to attorney's fees anyway, so that they may potentially
benefit monetarily by arbitrating their disputes.3 ' Full disclosure and
honesty prior to obtaining consent will ensure that the process is fair
307. Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 173. However, some scholars argue that
this is a reasonable method of implementation based on the same analysis used
above to find consideration by an employee's continued employment In the individual
contract situation. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 891 ("[T]he longer the policy
has been in effect, the stronger the employer's argument that the employee, by con-
tinuing the employment, has implicitly consented to the arbitration provision."). While
continued employment after notice of the arbitration procedure is implemented is not
the most feasible method of attaining the consent of existing employees, it may, nev-
ertheless, lead to an estoppel argument for the employer to raise should the provi-
sion be protested. Knight, supra note 16, at 259.
308. Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 16, at 891. Courts have upheld this rationale in
validating arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 742 F.2d
334, 340 (7th Cir. 1984); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310
(N.D. IM. 1990); Lang v. Burlington N. R.R., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993).
309. Green, supra note 1, at WL10; see also supra notes 242-47 and accompanying
text (discussing the non-appealability of arbitration awards).
310. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text (discussing the jury trial rights
given up by choosing to arbitrate).
311. See supra notes 233-58 and accompanying text.
312. See infra notes 320-401 and accompanying text.
313. See King et al., supra note 31, at 99.
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and agreeable for all involved, thus eliminating the need to determine
subsequently whether consent was properly obtained and thereby risk-
ing the finality of the process. " '
C. Pre-Dispute Tiered Approach to Dispute Resolution for
All Employees
Employers could also design a dispute resolution system that in-
cludes binding arbitration but that also includes other methods of dis-
pute resolution, such as mediation or med-arb, so that the employee
has a choice of procedures.8'
D. Post Dispute Binding Arbitration for All Employees
In lieu of the above procedures, which address pre-dispute agree-
ments to arbitrate, there are other ways by which employers could
encourage the use of arbitration and ultimately reduce their court time,
while also ensuring that the employees have bargained for the pro-
cess."6 Employers could give their employees the option to arbitrate
after the dispute arises so that the employee has a better idea of what
to expect from taking her case to court, yet can still choose to arbitrate
if she so wishes."7 By doing so, the employer may still avoid trial by
bringing the option of arbitration to the attention of an employee who
might not otherwise have considered it, while simultaneously indicating
the employer's desire to engage in the process of arbitration to resolve
the matter expediently."' In addition, the agreement is more likely to
be found knowing and voluntary, since the employee had a clear
choice, thus providing more certainty that the arbitration will be final
and binding.31
314. Bales, supra note 20, at 1898; see also Knight, supra note 16, at 259.
315. Dick, supra note 14, at 54; see also Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 264 (advocat-
ing a three step procedure starting with communication of the problem to a superior
and peer review, next providing for mediation and, lastly arbitration).
316. See ifra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
317. Berger, supra note 31, at 713. But see Dee, supra note 58, at 408 (noting that
post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are more difficult to obtain).
318. By showing that the employer is open to resolving the dispute without having
to go to trial, the employer indicates his willingness to work together which may re-
sult in greater likelihood that the employee will also agree to the arbitration. See su-
pm note 75 and accompanying text.
319. Berger, supra note 31, at 713; see also Dee, supra note 58, at 409-10.
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VI. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT AGAINST THE HARSH EFFECTS
OF FORFEITING BOTH THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE ARBITRATION AWARD
Due to the Supreme Court's willingness to uphold the arbitration of
employment related disputes, including those involving statutory rights,
an opposing party may seek to avoid the arbitration by attacking the
process itself.' By enacting safeguards within the arbitration con-
tract, a process fair to all can be achieved, thus, eliminating need or
cause to subsequently invalidate the procedure."
Currently, there remains a need for improvement in choosing unbi-
ased, experienced arbitrators,' defining the scope of discovery, es-
tablishing standards for receiving evidence,32I requiring written opin-
ions' and allowing for review of arbitration decisions involving statu-
tory claims.m
A. Selecting Unbiased, Experienced Arbitrators
1. Preventing Bias
To ensure that the participants have a fair opportunity to be heard
and to reduce the possibility that one side will be favored over another,
bias on the part of arbitrators must be protected against.' 7 Indeed, the
Supreme Court noted in Commonwealth Coatings Corporation v. Con-
tinental Casualty Company,' "we should... be even more scrupu-
lous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the
former have completely free reign to decide the law as well as the facts
and are not subject to appellate review."
a. Erring toward full disclosure of conflicting relationships
In light of the confusion in the area of disclosure concerning what
constitutes "an impression of possible bias,"' the best policy for the
320. Howard, supra note 137, at 34-35.
321. See infra notes 322-401 and accompanying text.
322. See infra notes 327-7 and accompanying text
323. See infra notes 358-71 and accompanying text.
324. See iit notes 372-83 and accompanying text.
325. See infra notes 384-92 and accompanying text.
326. See infra notes 393-401 and accompanying text
327. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-49
(1968).
328. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
329. Id. at 149.
330. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
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arbitrator is to err on the side of disclosure and to inform the parties
about any business or personal relationship with either party." This
way, the parties can choose to disqualify the arbitrator before the arbi-
tration begins if they see a possible problem.' In the event that the
parties choose to keep the arbitrator, they will have been fully informed
of any potential conflict and will not have cause to challenge the
arbitrator's decision based on bias after the fact." The disclosure
should be liberal so that no information is hidden and the parties can
proceed without having to fear that the award will be vacated subse-
quent to the arbitration, forcing the parties to start over.m The best
way to ensure that arbitrators disclose what is required is for employ-
ers to write these broad disclosure provisions into the arbitration con-
tract' The arbitrator will thus avoid having to rely on the confusing
case law in this area and will be clear as to what she must disclose.'
b. Avoiding exclusive use of one institutional arbitration service
Although the effect of institution-employer relationships has not yet
been tested in the courts, such challenges can be expected in the near
331. This gives more control to the parties to decide for themselves which arbitra-
tors may be biased. See infva notes 332-36 and accompanying text. But see George L.
Blum, Disclosing Conflict of Interest in the California Arbitration System: Banwalt
v. Hernandez and the Erosion of Duty, 5 Oio ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL, 97, 108-09
(1989) ("impermissible relationships" based upon fiduciary grounds should be dis-
closed; "permissible relationships" based on professional or social connections should
not).
332. The purpose is to create a procedure that all will perceive as fair so that
there will be no grounds for dissatisfaction after the fact Whether a personal rela-
tionship will actually affect an arbitrator's decision is really irrelevant because if the
party perceived it as such then there will be dissatisfaction. By disclosing all rela-
tionships, the parties are in control to decide for themselves, before the process
begins, whether the arbitrator is acceptable.
333. See Disco, supra note 151, at 116 ("If the standard is unclear then parties will
be tempted to seek vacation of unfavorable arbitration awards in every instance by
attempting to capitalize on a vague and inherently manipulable standard."). This pro-
posal will help increase finality (a benefit of arbitration) without jeopardizing the fair-
ness of the procedure.
334. See Blum, supra note 331, at 112-13 (noting the undesirability of having a con-
flict of interest arise after the parties have already invested time and money in the
arbitration process).
335. See Kilroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 36.
336. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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future.' Employers can, however, avoid the implications which arise
from such relationships and bypass potential court scrutiny.' First,
employers should avoid using an institutional arbitration service that is
for-profit.' In the alternative, employers should eliminate the inclu-
sion of any one arbitration service as the provider of the arbitrators.3 "
There are many private arbitrators practicing; allowing the parties to
choose independently from the whole spectrum of arbitrators is prefer-
able.u Second, both sides should participate in the selection process
with information helpful in this process being made equally available to
both sides.' An employee should never be compelled to arbitrate if
the arbitrator is chosen solely by the employer.' Lastly, each side
should be able to have one peremptory challenge and unlimited chal-
lenges for cause to reduce any hint of bias."
2. Experience
a. In employment law
Experience should also be considered when selecting an arbitra-
tor.' For employment disputes, arbitrators should be experienced in
employment law. " The American Arbitration Association requires that
337. See Disco, supra note 151, at 142.
338. See infra notes 339-44 and accompanying text.
339. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is one such non profit provider,
formed to "encourage the use of arbitration and other techniques of voluntary dispute
resolution." Disco, supra note 151, at 138. Since they are non-profit, the desire for
repeat business may not be as great as with a for-profit provider. But see id at 139
(even nonprofit organizations have interests in repeat business because their mere
existence depends on it).
340. Talcing away the dependence on one particular provider also takes away the
provider's dependence on the employer as a constant source of business, lessening
the need to favor the employer.
341. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (inferring
that arbitration clauses may not be enforced if the arbitrator selection provisions are
too restrictive). This will not only help prevent repeat bias but will open up the
number of qualified arbitrators, and the employee will view the process as more fair.
Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 482.
342. Berger, supra note 31, at 716. For example, if an employee has no idea how
to go about finding an arbitrator, the employer should provide the names of a few
different sources so that the employee may choose someone.
343. Id.
344. Kilroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 36.
345. Dee, supra note 58, at 415-16. But see Robert C. Barrett, SPIDR Commission
on Qualifications: An Update on Its Current Work, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ALTERNA-
TIE 1994, at 331 (PLI Uitig. & Admin. Handbook Series No. 504, 1994), available in
TP-ALL database, at WL 1, 19. (Many neutrals who do not have a law degree or ex-
perience in a given field make "excellent dispute resolvers.").
346. See Allison & Stahlhut, supra note 58, at 173.
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its arbitrators have "familiarity" in the employment field if they are to
arbitrate such disputes."? This does not seem appropriate given that
courts are now allowing arbitrators to arbitrate important statutory
claims in addition to normal contractual disputes.' This is especially
a concern due to the fact that many arbitrators either do not want to
decide statutory rights or feel they are currently unqualified to do
so.' As such, there should be some additional training so that arbitra-
tors are able to handle the complexities of civil rights statutes.'
To accommodate the needs of the parties, the following proposal
should be implemented to ensure that the arbitrators have the requisite
experience in the employment field." First, the arbitrator should have
a minimum of seven years of practice in labor/employment law.' Sec-
ond, it would be preferable if the arbitrator is either in an employment
law society, so that she is keeping up on current trends and issues in
the field, or participates in continuing education for employment dis-
putes.' Finally, claims involving large amounts of damages should be
heard by an arbitrator who is also a retired judge so that the decisions
do not stray too far from the prevailing law.'
b. In arbitration
In addition, general arbitration training of some sort should be re-
quired.' Lawyers may know the law, but additional skills are needed
347. Howard, supra note 137, at 36.
348. Since statutory rights are designed to "promote public ends," if it is found that
they can be arbitrated, the decision-maker should be someone fairly well-versed in
the law so that the goals of the statute are carried out. But see King et al., supra
note 31, at 102 (since the parties choose their arbitrator, they have the power to
select someone knowledgeable about all the claims at hand).
349. Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 265.
350. New Trends, supra note 31, at 12.
351. See irfra notes 352-56 and accompanying text
352. This will ensure that the arbitrator has a solid foundation in this area of law
and is not just relying on knowledge gained from a law school course.
353. Barrett, supra, note 345, at WL 11. This is needed due to the constantly
changing state of the law. Id.
354. Many arbitrators are retired judges. The need to have judges decide large dis-
putes is evident in that generally a substantial wrong has occurred to merit such a
claim and as much protection as possible should be afforded to ensure a just result.
355. For example, the securities industry requires all arbitrators to go through spe-
cialized training prior to sitting on their arbitration panels. Howard, supra note 137,
at 33. Also, the state of Florida requires general dispute resolution training in addi-
tion to an academic degree. Barrett, supra note 345, at WL 15.
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for a lawyer to be an effective arbitrator.'"
If such procedures are followed, both parties will be ensured of a
competent, unbiased arbitrator so as to both reduce the possibility of
disapproval after the award has been made, and eliminate the need for
the currently non-existent appeals process.'7
B. Discovery Procedures
A second proposal to protect the integrity of the arbitration process
and to preserve the rights of the parties concerns the standards for
discovery.' Generally, production of documents for discovery is al-
lowed during the arbitration hearing, but not before.' As such, some
scholars believe that parties should authorize the arbitrator to allow
discovery to whatever extent she desires.' " Neither of these proce-
dures is adequate to put the parties on an equal footing, however, be-
cause in employment disputes, the employer may have the benefit of
important documents which the employee may not get to see until the
beginning of the hearing, if at all."
As such, standard discovery procedures need to be in place and out-
lined in the arbitration agreement so that both parties know from the
beginning which documents will be exchanged.' Exchange of docu-
ments where there is a "substantial, demonstrable need" is an appropri-
ate solution that some commentators propose.' In addition, the con-
tract should provide that the employer produce all relevant employee
files prior to any arbitration hearing. " Furthermore, the employee
should have the opportunity to depose at least one of the employer's
representatives.'
356. See Barrett, supra note 345, at WL 20. Barrett lists necessary arbitrator skills
as the "(a) ability to make decisions; (b) ability to run a hearing; (c) ability to distin-
guish facts from opinions; and (d) ability to write reasoned opinions." I& at WL 21.
357. Blum, supra note 331, at 97. "Unless all parties involved perceive that the arbi-
tration has been conducted by an essentially impartial observer, much of the power
of this dispute resolution mechanism will be lost." d.; see also Disco, supra note
151, at 116.
358. See infra notes 359-71 and accompanying text.
359. New Tends, supra note 31, at 13.
360. Klroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 36.
351. See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text
362. See King et al., supra note 31, at 102.
363. Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 464.
364. See King et aL, supra note 31, at 102; see also Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52,
at 464. The New York Stock Exchange procedural rules providing for document pro-
duction, information requests, depositions, and subpoenas are a good example to
follow when implementing discovery provisions. Kllroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 36.
These rules were accepted by the GUmer Court as providing adequate procedural
safeguards in the arbitral forum. Id,
365. Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 464. This requirement is based on, the
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Some scholars reject this approach, pointing out that if standard
discovery is built back into arbitration procedures, the benefits com-
monly associated with arbitration will be jeopardized.' However, the
goal of arbitration is. not to have the dispute resolved in a few days, or
even a few weeks, but to resolve it expeditiously while maintaining a
better relationship among the parties."*' These objectives can be main-
tained concurrently with the implementation of more even-handed pro-
cedures for discovery. Furthermore, employees will be more satis-
fied with the proposed procedure because they will not have to forfeit
the rights they would have under binding arbitration as currently prac-
ticed.69
With the goals of arbitration in mind, it should be evident that what-
ever can be done to make the procedure more conducive to the parties'
needs will help to promote usage of arbitration in the first place.'
Likewise, such an open-minded approach will lessen the likelihood that
the parties will be displeased after the fact."
C. Admission of Evidence
The manner in which parties present evidence in arbitration also
needs to be reformed in order to promote arbitration as a favorable
alternative to both employer and employee.' Currently, evidence is
premise that the employer will have greater knowledge of the reasons for termination
than will the employee. Id.
366. Butler, supra note 14, at 539-40.
367. See supra note 1 (listing the benefits of arbitration); see also Spelfogel, supra
note 23, at 263:
The goals and advantages of any ADR or arbitration mechanism are to re-
duce the risks, costs and often lengthy delays associated with an
over-burdened legal stem that in the opinion of many is out of control; to
preserve workplace unity;, to foster and improve internal communication and
employee morale; to provide employees with an outside option where they do
not believe internal processes are fair, and to diminish legal expenses.
Id,
368. Even with discovery, an arbitration will likely result in a speedier resolution of
the dispute because other delays associated with trial, such as finding an available
courtroom and impaneling a jury, are not present.
369. See Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 464.
370. Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 265.
371. If the employee has been adequately protected, there will be no cause for dis-
satisfaction.
372. See infra notes 373-83 and accompanying text.
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freely admitted if it is the least bit relevant.' This process allows the
admission of certain prejudicial evidence that normally would be ex-
cluded in court.' Such liberal evidence rules are meant to streamline
the arbitration procedure so that it is not subject to all the rigidities of
a trial." Having such a flexible standard, however, creates room for
abuse. 6
To ensure that the parties do not "sneak in" evidence that they know
should not be admitted, there are two possible solutions.' First, the
parties can attempt to find arbitrators who are lawyers known to follow
the rules of evidence, rather than relying on non-lawyers or lawyers
who take a liberal approach to the admission of evidence."
Second, an honor system could be enacted so that the parties do not
attempt to introduce evidence that they know is not admissible under
formal rules of evidence.' Sanctions could be imposed to ensure
compliance with this procedure.'m Since the tendency to admit evi-
dence improperly may already be somewhat reduced (as there is no
jury to potentially sway),"' this, combined with the threat of sanc-
tions, may encourage attorneys to "play by the rules" so that the arbi-
tration will proceed smoothly and quickly.' As such, evidentiary
problems can be precluded before they become an issue, ensuring that
the arbitrator will not be privy to any prejudicial evidence and that the
parties receive a fair and just proceeding.'
373. New Trends, supra note 31, at 13; see also supra notes 254-58 and accompa-
nying text.
374. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
376. See New Trends, supra note 31, at 13 (noting that such loose evidence rules
scan be troublesome").
377. See itfra notes 378.83 and accompanying text.
378. Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 247.
379. This would allow the parties more control over the procedure and hold them
accountable for any errors which may disturb the award.
380. Currently, sanctions are available for bringing frivolous claims to the arbitra-
tion. Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 476. Sanctions are also used to ensure arbi-
tration participants comply with the discovery provisions. Id, at 483. Sanctions could
be used in the same manner to prevent admission of evidence which the lawyers
know would not be admissible in court. Without sanctions, such a system would
have no enforcement mechanism and would probably not be effective.
381. At trial, lawyers often will attempt to admit evidence which they know is not
admissible in hopes of swaying the jury to their side.
382. For the employer then, the arbitration will still proceed faster than trial, yet
the employee will still be protected as she would in a court adjudication.
383. This will eliminate the harsh effect of a non-appealable award because there
will not be cause for dissatisfaction as the parties were treated fairly.
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D. Written Opinions
Generally, arbitrators "are not required to find facts, give reasons for
awards, or describe the processes by which they arrived at their deci-
sions."' While the trend toward requiring written decisions is grow-
ing,' this practice is still not standard.' To maintain some sem-
blance of uniformity of decisions, written opinions should be issued by
the arbitrators in all employment disputes. 7 "Express requirements
that the arbitrator include findings of fact and a discussion of applica-
ble law" are also preferred so that the likelihood of the decision being
accepted is improved.' This is especially important in the employ-
ment field, given the high number of disputes arising and the similarly
high number of claims which are being resolved outside the courts.'
Requiring written decisions would make the arbitrators more ac-
countable for their decisions,' would help to ensure conformity with
legal precedent and the current developments in employment law,"
and would reduce the need or desire for rehearings.'
E. Standard of Review for Statutory Claims
The final manner in which the arbitration contract can be fortified to
protect the rights of all parties involved is to include a provision for
reviewability of statutory claims.' It has been shown that courts can-
not be indifferent to legal errors in these cases because the
unreviewability of the "arbitrator's construction of the statute does not
adequately protect the public interest."' Allowing court review of
384. Stein v. Drake, 254 P.2d 613, 617 (1953) (citing Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v.
C.S.T., Ltd., 174 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1946), overruled on other grounds by Brink v. Alegro
Bldrs., Inc., 375 P.2d 435, 438 (1962)). But see Brunet, supra note 74, at 89 (stating
that it is the common practice of labor arbitrators to write opinions).
385. The California Arbitration Act and* the NYSE are two systems that require writ-
ten decisions.
386. Because arbitration claims do not usually result in written opinions there is
nothing to use as precedent Thomas, supra note 79, at 795.
387. Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 464; see also Allison & Stahlhut, supra note
58, at 173.
388. Kilroy & Sachs, supra note 42, at 36.
389. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
390. Waks & Gadsby, supra note 52, at 465.
391. Id.
392. Id,
393. See infra notes 394-401 and accompanying text.
394. Berger, supra note 31, at 718-19. This is because "private forums, such as
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such arbitration decisions would, of course, remove some of the finality
of the arbitrator's decision; however, with implementation of the proper
procedural safeguards, the law should have already been adequately
followed making review unnecessary.' Only when a breakdown in
this process occurs does a safety net become necessary."
In such situations, to expedite the process and prevent unnecessary
delay, a reviewing court should defer to the factual findings of the arbi-
trator, much as deference would be given to a trial court.' As such,
efficiency over trial may still be maintained in that the parties do not
have to re-arbitrate the whole case.' Accordingly, the goals of the ar-
bitration will have been carried out"s
By implementing the above procedural protections and including
them in the contract to arbitrate, arbitration of employment disputes
will be more fair during the proceedings." ° As a result, there will be
less chance that the parties will be disgruntled after the process, there-
by leading to greater finality and satisfaction with the process over-
all 401
VII. CONCLUSION
Alternative dispute resolution is being implemented in many are-
nas.' This has been especially true in the area of employment law,
largely due to the high number of disputes arising each year as a result
of Congress granting numerous statutory rights to employeesn and to
the changing dynamics of the workplace, resulting in the downturn of
at-will employment.' With the implementation of arbitration, the fa-
vored method of alternatively resolving employment disputes, comes
arbitration, may resolve disputes on the basis of nonlegal social mores" whereas
"public forums . . . protect basic legal values." Malin & Ladenson, supra note 58, at
1189. Since statutory rights are generally enacted for public policy reasons, and not
as a means for individual redress, public accountability is important. See id.
395. The goal is to increase finality by improving the procedure overall. However,
despite this safeguarding, it will sometimes be necessary for a limited review to en-
sure fairness overall.
396. If the arbitrator's decision adequately reflects the law, and fairness has pre-
vailed throughout the proceeding, the losing party would have no cause and no in-
centive to appeal.
397. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 58, at 1238.
398. See id,
399. See supra notes 58-98 and accompanying text.
400. See supvr notes 320-99 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 320-26 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
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apprehension as to the legal rights being placed in jeopardy by opting
out of the jury systent This is of great concern primarily because
this opting-out is not always bargained for by an employee, but is gen-
erally found to be binding nonetheless."
Therefore, to ensure that both sides are truly knowledgeable about
the arbitration process, and to preserve important rights, certain proce-
dures should be detailed in any arbitration agreement before being
presented to an employee for a signature.' By implementing the
above procedures with respect to arbitrator selection," discovery,"
rules of evidence,1 0 written decisions,4 and reviewability of statuto-
ry claims,42 arbitration proceedings for employment disputes should
proceed in a fair manner for all involved. In addition, arbitration pro-
ceedings will be completed more quickly and in a less hostile environ-
ment than the courtroom.413 As such, the goals of arbitration will be
upheld, as will the rights traditionally afforded by trial, and both parties
will benefit from the process.
1 4
MICHELE M. BUSE
405. See supra notes 233-58 and accompanying text.
406. See suprm notes 189-214 and accompanying text
407. See supra notes 320-401 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 327-57 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 358-71 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 372-83 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 384-92 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 393-401 and accompanying text
413. See Knight, supra note 16, at 251.
414. See supra notes 273-401 and accompanying text.
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